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GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT: THE MOVEMENT
TOWARD LOCAL, COMMUNITY-BASED, VOLUNTARY
PROGRAMS
By: John C. Peck,* Rick Illgner,** Jakob Wiley,*** & Constance Crittenden
Owen****
Editor's Note: Much of the substance of this article is based on
presentations made by the four authors on a panel at the annual
meeting of the American Water Resources Association, November
13 17, 2016, in Orlando, Florida. The title of their panel session
was "Groundwater Conservation Through Pumping Restrictions. "
The participants described a spectrum of types ofprograms, ranging
from state-imposed pumping restrictions to voluntary restrictions
employed by pumpers.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Problem Stated
Worldwide, groundwater aquifers are under stress.' Conflicts abound.2
* Connell Teaching Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Kansas School of Law, and Special
Counsel, Foulston Siefkin, LLP.
** Retired Groundwater Resource Specialist, working in Kansas and Texas from 1977 2017.
Associate Attorney, Schroeder Law Offices, Portland, Oregon, PC.
Administrative Law Judge, Division of Water Resources, Kansas Department of Agriculture;
Acting Chair, Kansas Water Authority.
1 See Somini Sengupta & Weiyi Cai, A Quarter of Humanity Faces Looming Water Crisis, N.Y.
TIwES (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.nyfimes.com/interactive/2019/08/06/climate/world-water-
stress.html [https://perna.cc/9YM6-UWTY]; see also Cheryl Katz, As Groundwater Dwindles, a
Global Food Shock Looms, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC (Dec. 22, 2016),
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/12/groundwater-depletion-global-food-supply/
[https://penna.cc/S5DV-J8FX] ("A 2015 study based on satellite observations showed that most
of the world's largest aquifers 21 out of 37-are being drained faster than they can refill. 'A
number of studies point to the overuse of groundwater and the tremendous risk that our water and
food security are under,' says water scientist Jay Famiglietti of the NASA Jet Propulsion
Laboratory, who led the satellite study."); Lucy Craymer, China's Growing Thirst for Water Stirs
Backlash Overseas, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 5, 2019, 8:54 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cinas-
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The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) reports this to be true in the United States
as well.3 For decades, American state governments facing the problem have
attempted through legislation4 and administrative action5 to reduce the rate of
depletion of groundwater aquifers. Some areas in Kansas6 have been closed
down completely to the issuance of new groundwater pumping permits. The
judiciary has been active as well. A court or administrative agency may force
reduced pumping by some pumpers in a defined aquifer in an attempt to slow
down groundwater mining.8 Or, a court may order a single well owner to
growing-thirst-for-bottled-water-stirs-backlash-overseas-11567675805 [https://perma.cc/3VMD-
DMCC] (stating that New Zealand is complaining about China's withdrawing water from New
Zealand aquifers to supply bottled water).
2 See Laura Parker, What You Need to Know About the World's Water Wars, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC
(July 14, 2016), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/07/world-aquifers-water-wars/
[https://penna.cc/53DH-AWQQ] ("Underground water is being pumped so aggressively around
the globe that land is sinking, civil wars are being waged, and agriculture is being transformed.").
' See Groundwater Decline and Depletion, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., https://water.usgs.gov
/edu/gwdepletion.htil [https://perma.cc/BJZ9-S6HK] ("Many areas of the United States are
experiencing groundwater depletion.") (illustrating that groundwater depletion can cause
lowering of the water table, increased costs to pumpers, land subsidence, and deterioration of
water quality); Michael Sainato & Chelsea Skojec, Bottled Water Is Sucking Florida Dry, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/15/opinion/bottled-water-is-sucking-
florida-dry.html [https://penna.cc/PJ68-D5HB] (explaining over-pumping by corporations,
especially Nestld, is causing groundwater aquifers to shrink).
4 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1020 (West 1927); GROUNDWATER MGMT. DISTRICTS
ASS'N, http://gmdausa.org [https://penna.cc/9V69-XVBG] (stating that GMDs in several states
have formed an association, the Groundwater Management Districts Association (GMDA), with
the mission: "To protect and preserve groundwater quality and quantity for future generations,
GMDA promotes conservation and conjunctive use, public education and state sovereignty.")
Members of the association include districts from Colorado, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Nebraska, New Mexico, Texas, and California. The five Kansas GMDs described in Section
IV.B. below are members.
' Many sections of the administrative regulations of the Kansas Division of Water Resources are
devoted to regulating groundwater use. See, e.g., KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 5-1-1 (2018). The Kansas
Administrative Regulations feature the Equus Beds Groundwater Management District No. 2. See
KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 5-22-2 (2009) (describing well spacing); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 5-22-3
(2009) (describing waste); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 5-22-4 (2018) (describing flow meters); KAN.
ADMIN. REGS. § 5-22-7 (2018) (describing safe yield).
6 Kansas regulations contain several sections that close specific areas to new permits. See, e.g.,
KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 5-3-26 (2009) (including Pawnee and Buckner drainage basins).
7 See, e.g., Garetson Bros. v. Am. Warrior, Inc., 435 P.3d 1153 (Kan. Ct. App. 2019) (illustrating
that a vested rights holder successfully enjoined pumping by several nearby wells held by
appropriation right holders). Interstate disputes also arise over groundwater. See, e.g., Kansas v.
Colorado, 556 U.S. 98 (2009) (No. 105 Original of the U.S. Supreme Court); Hood ex rel
Mississippi v. City of Memphis, 570 F.3d 625, 627 (5th Cir. 2009).
8 See, e.g., Baker v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 513 P.2d 627 (Idaho 1973); see generally DIV. OF
WATER RES., KAN. STATE BD. OF AGRIC., IN THE MATTER OF THE DESIGNATION OF AN
INTENSIVE GROUNDWATER USE CONTROL AREA IN BARTON, RUSH AND NESS COUNTIES,
KANSAS (1992) (stating that the Chief Engineer (1) recognized interrelationship between
groundwater and surface water; (2) allowed vested rights to continue under their certificates; (3)
divided appropriation rights into two large groups, "Senior Rights" (prior to October 1, 1965) and
"Junior Rights" (after October 1, 1965); and (4) ordered pump restrictions in Senior Rights and
much larger restrictions in Junior Rights).
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reduce or curtail pumping altogether because of impairment of another well. 9
This article treats various methods in which this problem is being
addressed in the United States and the ways they have evolved over the last
few decades. Water professionals commonly call the general approach to the
problem "groundwater management." Some dictionary definitions of
"manage" include the following: "handle or address with a degree of skill" and
"treat with care,"'1 "control . . . something,"" "succeed in accomplishing,'
12
and "control the use or exploitation of"' 3 Any person's answer to the question
of whether any of these various methods are working "may depend ... in part
on the person's background, biases, perspective, and perhaps even present
employment.'
14
B. Some New Approaches
These dropping aquifer levels across the world are challenging policy-
makers to reevaluate approaches to groundwater governance. Surface water
governance is often regulated by a central state authority applying a standard
permitting system across the state.'5 Each river may have individual planning,
limiting use to maintain minimum stream flows or other policies decided by
the state government. Similarly, over-extraction of groundwater resources has
historically been addressed using top-down regulation of individual users by
state agencies. While this system may effectively prevent resource destruction,
the results of this kind of regulation can be unpopular or even destructive to
communities dependent on the resource.
Unlike surface water governance, groundwater governance appears to be
evolving toward a focus on local planning and management. For groundwater,
some states have implemented policies that attempt to limit aquifer use to
sustainable annual yields (SAY) 16 or safe yield, or that designate special areas
of additional groundwater regulations. 17 Even these terms are controversial, are
often undefined, and according to some hydrologists not objectively
9 E.g., Garetson Bros., 435 P.3d 1153 (illustrating such a conflict in a prior appropriation state).
10 Manage, WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 691 (1981).
11 Manage, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY (2019), https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/en
glish/manage [https://penna.cc/M5DP-BCEH].12 Manage, MERRIAM-WEB STER (2019), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/manage
[https://penna.cc/L5F9-NVSK].
13 Manage, LEXiCO (2019), https://enoxforddictionaries.com/definition/manage [https://perma.cc
/D6UP-7ABU].
14 John C. Peck, Groundwater Management in Kansas: A Brief History and Assessment, 15 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 441, 454 (2006) [hereinafter Peck, Groundwater Management in Kansas].
15 See Water Appropriation Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-701 82a-773 (requiring permits for
both surface water and groundwater); DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL
3-4 (5th ed. 2015).
16 Frans R.P. Kalf & Donald R. Woolley, Applicability and Methodology of Determining
Sustainable Yield in Groundwater Systems, 13 HYDROGEOLOGICAL J. 295, 296 (2005); see also
KAN. ADMIN. REGS. §§ 5-21-4, 5-22-7, 5-25-4 (2018).
17 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1036 (West 1978); see infra Section IV.B.
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provable.'8 Yet, these terms have reached an iconic status, forming the basis
for determining groundwater use levels in many states' water codes. Other
states have used a "wait-and-see" approach, allowing the individual
groundwater users to litigate their own rights as conflicts appear. Even with
these varying state policy approaches, as described in this article, groundwater
users in some areas are now seeking more local management of their
underlying aquifers and in some cases have formed organizations to improve
groundwater management in their aquifers.
C. A Spectrum of Types of Pumping Restrictions
Several states are promoting voluntary pumping reductions. These
attempts are not restricted to educational programs that merely encourage
pumpers to use more efficient systems. In some states, cooperation at the local
level has resulted in novel management approaches. Kansas, for example, has
adopted legislation that permits and encourages pumpers to enter into
voluntary, binding agreements that result in less pumping. To put in context
the move to voluntariness, we describe a spectrum of types of pumping
restrictions, from the extremes of state-imposed pumping restrictions at one
end to voluntary reductions at the other. Between these extremes lie variations
and gradations of programs and actions. After we lay out the general spectrum,
we describe specific programs: financial incentives used by the Edwards
Aquifer Authority (EAA) in Texas to achieve pumping reductions; local
grassroots efforts in Colorado, Oregon, and California that illustrate attempts at
local community-based management; and moves to voluntary programs in
Kansas.
Attempting to categorize pump restriction types based on "voluntariness"
is difficult. That term itself is complex and has a variety of meanings and
connotations. Related ideas such as motive, consent, and agreement are
important in this context. One can picture a simple horizontal line representing
a spectrum of types of pumping restrictions, with points along its path.
The point at the left end of the spectrum represents the extreme type of
restriction in which a state court or legislature orders a curtailment of pumping
of a water right based on a rationale not anticipated by the water right holder
when the water right was first obtained. An example is the California Supreme
Court's use of the Public Trust Doctrine in a 1983 surface water case in which
plaintiff sought to enjoin diversions by Los Angeles in the Mono Lake
region.19 Future courts could follow the reasoning of a 2000 Hawaii case
20 and
18 See John Bredehoeft, Safe Yield and the Water Budget Myth, 35 GROUNDWATER 929, 929
(1997); see also John Bredehoeft, It is the Discharge, 45 GROUNDWATER 523, 523 (2007); S. L.
DINGMAN, PHYSICAL HYDROLOGY 450 (3d ed. 2015) ("It is widely believed, even by many
hydrologists and water-resource managers, that the sustainable rate of extraction-or 'safe
yield'-of ground water from a basin equals the rate of natural recharge . . . It should be clear
from the preceding discussion that this is not true .... ").
19 Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 732 (Cal. 1983) (enbanc).
20 In re Water Use Permit Application, 9 P.3d 409, 445, 447 (Haw. 2000) ("In Hawaii, this court
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a recent California district court case2' in applying the Public Trust Doctrine
more broadly to include groundwater reserves.
The point next to the Public Trust reductions would be forced pumping
restrictions or closures of wells to protect senior water rights. A Kansas court,
for example, recently enjoined pumping of several neighboring junior
groundwater appropriators in favor of a vested right.22 In 1973, Idaho23 and in
1989, Oregon24 courts restricted pumping by imposing safe yield on a portion
of, or on all of, an aquifer. Kansas followed in a 1992 administrative case by
establishing the Walnut Creek Intensive Groundwater Use Control Area
(IGUCA),25 described in more detail in Section IV.B., below. These water
right holders have voluntarily obtained their rights with knowledge of the state
statutory system, which prescribes the shutting down of junior water pumpers
that are impairing holders of more senior rights. But presumably they have not
voluntarily assumed the aquifer safe yield restrictions later imposed by the
court or administrative agency.
The third point of the spectrum represents cessation of pumping when a
government takes a water right by eminent domain and pays the water right
holder the value of the property taken. These are involuntary takings but are
compensated. Water right holders, like other real property owners, know or
should know that their property rights may be subject to condemnation.
26
has recognized, based on founding principles of law in this jurisdiction, a distinct public trust
encompassing all the water resources of the state . . . Based on the plain language of our
constitution and a reasoned modem view of the sovereign reservation, we confirm that the public
trust doctrine applies to all water resources, unlimited by any surface-ground distinction."); Jack
Tuholske, Trusting the Public Trust: Application of the Public Trust Doctrine to Groundwater
Resources, 9VT. J. ENVTL. L. 189, 236 (2008) (applying the public trust doctrine to groundwater
offers "a new paradigm for using groundwater wisely"); see also John C. Peck & Doris K. Nagel,
Legal Aspects of Water Resources Planning, 37 KAN. L. REv. 199, 264 73 (1989) (suggesting
that the Kansas Legislature had laid the groundwork for applying the doctrine when it declared in
1945 that all waters were dedicated to the use of the public, but that further clarity could be
provided if the legislature would add public trust language to the statute); cf State ex rel. Meek v.
Hays, 785 P.2d 1356 (Kan. 1990) (declining to adopt public trust doctrine in case involving
ownership of beds of non-navigable stream).
21 See generally Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Res. Control, No. 34-2010-80000583, 2014
WL 8843074 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 15, 2014).
22 Garetson Bros. v. Am. Warrior, Inc., 435 P.3d 1153 (Kan. Ct. App. 2019).
23 Bakery. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 513 P.2d 627 (Idaho 1973).
24Doherty v. Ore. Water Res. Dir., 783 P.2d 519 (Or. 1989) (enbanc).
25 See generally DIv. OF WATER RES., KAN. STATE BD. OF AGRIC., IN THE MATTER OF THE
DESIGNATION OF AN INTENSIVE GROUNDWATER USE CONTROL AREA IN BARTON, RUSH AND
NESS COUNTIES, KANSAS (1992) (stating that Chief Engineer (1) recognized interrelationship
between groundwater and surface water; (2) allowed vested rights to continue under their
certificates; (3) divided appropriation rights into two large groups, "Senior Rights" (prior to
October 1, 1965) and "Junior Rights" (after October 1, 1965); and (4) ordered pump restrictions
in Senior Rights and much larger restrictions in Junior Rights).
26 See, e.g., City of Thornton v. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 575 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1983)
(en banc) (allowing city to condemn water rights under its constitutionally-derived home rule
power); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 42-3 15 (West 1923) (permitting condemnation of water and water
rights; the Kansas Legislature enacted this provision in 1891 prior to the 1945 Kansas
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The next point represents voluntary pump reduction methods that are
clearly and directly financially-induced, such as the Voluntary Irrigation
Suspension Program Option (VISPO) of the EAA in Texas,2 federal programs
such as Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP),"8 Conservation
Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP),29 Agriculture Water Enhancement
Program (AWEP),30 Regional Conservation Partnership Program (RCPP);3'
Colorado's Rio Grande Water Conservation District (RGWCD) which uses
CREP (discussed in Section III.B. below); state programs like the Water
Transition Assistance Program (WTAP);32 privately funded foundation
Appropriation Act, and it's still applicable); see generally John C. Peck & Kent Weatherby,
Condemnation of Water and Water Rights in Kansas, 42 KAN. L. REV. 827 (1994) (describing
interests that can be condemned and entities with condemnation power under Kansas law).
27 See infra Section II.
28 Environmental Quality Incentive Program, U.S. DEP'T AGRIC. NAT. RESOURCES
CONSERVATION SERV. KAN., https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/ ational/programs
/financial/eqip/ [https://perna.cc/8ULM-4G8Q] (describing a voluntary, federal program that
provides financial incentives to agricultural producers "to plan and implement ... conservation
practices" that improve water and related natural resources on agricultural land). The Natural
Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) of the United States Department of Agriculture makes
payments to producers to implement approved conservation practices. Id.
29 The CREP is a partnership between the federal government (NRCS) and Kansas. See
Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program, U.S. DEP'T AGRIC. NAT. RESOURCES
CONSERVATION SERV. KAN., https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/ portal/nr
cs/detail/ks/newsroom/stories/?cid=nrcsl42p2_033621 [https://perma.cc/FM6V-DTK6]. The con-
tracts generally provide an upfront cash payment of up to $62/acre from the state and 14-15 years
of annual CRP-type payments from the Farm Service Agency (FSA) and an automatic permanent
dismissal of the water right after two years to allow establishment of cover crops. Email from
Mark Rude, Exec. Dir. of Sw. Kan. Groundwater Mgmt. Dist. No. 3, to John C. Peck (Mar. 29,
2016, 17:46 CST) (on file with author).
30 Similar in purpose to EQIP and CREP, the AWEP "is a voluntary conservation initiative that
provides financial . . . assistance to agricultural producers to implement agricultural water
enhancement activities on agricultural land for the purposes of conserving surface and ground
water .... It is "not a grant program ... [but is] a program whereby approved, eligible partners
will enter into multi-year agreements with NRCS to promote ground and surface water
conservation . I..." Agricultural Water Enhancement Program Farm Bill 2008 Archive, U.S.
DEP'T AGRIC. NAT. RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERV. KAN., https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/
wps/portal/nrcs/detail/ks/programs/financial/?cid=nrcsl42p2 032841 [https://perma.cc/E9PB-
MQHK]. Funding for AWEP was repealed in 2014 and "went by the wayside." Email from Steve
Frost, Admin. Manager of the Kan. Dep't of Agric., Div. of Conservation, to John C. Peck (July
31, 2017, 11:19 CST) (on file with author). However, the NRCS still supports and honors
contracts entered into prior to repeal. Agricultural Water Enhancement Program (AWEP), U.S.
DEP'T AGRIC. NAT. RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERV., https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/
portal/nrcs/detail/national/programs/?cid=nrcsl44p2_068627 [https://perma.cc/2CEA-JYUU].
31 Regional Conservation Partnership Program, U.S. DEP'T AGRIC. NAT. RESOURCES
CONSERVATION SERV. KAN., https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/programs/
financial/rcpp/ [https://perma.cc/2QSZ-QCU8] (describing RCPP, which connects partners with
producers and private landowners to design and implement voluntary conservation solutions that
benefit natural resources, agriculture, and the economy projects may address concerns such as
excess/insufficient water/drought).
32 Water Conservation Programs, KAN. DEP'T OF AGRIC. (Aug. 14, 2019), http://agriculture.ks.g
ov/.divisions-programs/division-of-conservation/water-conservation-programs [https://perma.cc/6
UJHV-L9F3] (describing the WTAP which "is a voluntary, incentive-based program that
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programs like the Northwest Kansas Groundwater Conservation Foundation;33
and "covenants not o sue" or "dry-year agreements"34 by neighboring water
right holders. Water right holders in these various programs voluntarily enter
into pumping restriction agreements and are paid to reduce pumping.
Sometimes just the recognition and fear that the state may impose
restrictions will lead to "voluntary" action by water right holders, illustrated at
the next point. For them, trite phrases such as "the writing is on the wall," and
"the storm clouds are rising" describe their predicament. The pigs' situation in
George Orwell's Animal Farm comes to mind: ". . . Napoleon announced that
there would be work on Sunday afternoons as well. This work was strictly
voluntary, but any animal who absented himself from it would have his rations
reduced in half"35
An example in Kansas is the Rattlesnake Creek agreement of 1994.36 That
agreement followed the order of the Kansas Chief Engineer in the Walnut
Creek IGUCA case in 1992, which forced restrictions on alluvial, groundwater
pumpers to achieve safe yield in a neighboring river basin.3 Perhaps the
examples of grassroots programs to manage groundwater in the three case
studies, described below in Section III, also illustrate this situation. 8 Similarly,
threats of boycotts of products can lead to "voluntary" restrictions.
39
permanently retires privately held irrigation water rights in exchange for payment by the State of
Kansas" with an intent to help restore aquifers and recover stream flows).
"3 Northwest Kansas Groundwater Management District No. 4 established the NW Kansas
Groundwater Conservation Foundation in 2003 to provide funds for voluntary retirements or set
asides. Email from Ray Luhman, Dist. Manager, Nw. Kan. Groundwater Mgmt. Dist. No. 4, to
John C. Peck (July 31, 2017, 11:19 CST) (on file with author). The foundation has been funded
entirely by GMD4, although the GMD has unsuccessfully sought entities for grants. Id. At one
time the foundation had over $500,000 and currently has about $370,000. Id. Money from the
foundation and other programs like WTAP, AWEP, and EQIP has been used to partially fund
buy-outs of approximately forty water rights. Id. After an economic study done for GMD4 that
indicated that "completely buying up a right was most harmful to the local value-added economy
.... " Id. The board modified its bylaws to allow for things other than buy-outs, and GMD4
currently funds cost share projects on soil probes. Email from Ray Luhman, Dist. Manager, Nw.
Kan. Groundwater Mgmt. Dist. No. 4, to John C. Peck (July 31, 2017, 09:30 CST) (on file with
author).
4 An example is the "dy-year water reliability contract" or "reliability contract" in Arizona. See
MICHAEL O'DONNELL & BONNIE COLBY, DRY-YEAR WATER SUPPLY RELIABILITY
CONTRACTS: A TOOL FOR WATER MANAGERS (2009), https://cals.arizona.edu/arec/sites/cals.
arizona.edu.arec/file s/publications/ewsr-dyo -Final-5-12 -10.pdf [https://perma.cc/XRR6-FDVB].
15 GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 51 (Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1945) (emphasis added).
36 See Peck, Groundwater Management in Kansas, supra note 14, at 452; see also infra Section
IV.B.
See infra Section IV.B.
38 See infra Section III.
3 See, e.g., Vanmala Subramaniam, A Look into Nestle's Controversial Water Bottling Business
in Canada, VICE (Sept. 30, 2016, 9:39 AM), https://www.vice.com/en ca/article/zn85qw/a-look-
into -nestle s-controversial-water-bottling-busine ss-in-canada [https://penna. cc/DBD8-C6DR]
(reporting that the bottling company, in disputes with several Canadian town regarding
groundwater withdrawals competing with other users during drought periods, "voluntarily
reduced their water extraction by 20 percent").
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Next on the spectrum is the sixth position, illustrated by Kansas's new
program for local enhanced management areas (LEMAs). This program
contains a "voluntary" element, but primarily in the sense that the impetus for
creating a LEMA comes from a groundwater management district (GMD),
which is a type of local special district the members of which are mostly
irrigators, and not from the state government.40
At the right end of the spectrum is the final point: voluntary pump
reduction programs in which irrigators, either individually or collectively-like
in the new Kansas water conservation areas (WCAs)41-try to preserve the
aquifer for altruistic, conservation, or other reasons. Stated another way: These
pumpers are voluntarily agreeing to reduce pumping the annual quantity of
water permitted under their water right, a property right, for the period of their
agreement but without changing the basic elements of their water rights. They
may seek, for example, intergenerational equity and the conservation of water
for future generations. Or, they might instead be guided, as are other pumpers,
with the "writing is on the wall" syndrome.
The concept of voluntariness in giving up one's property is found in other
arenas such as moral philosophy,42 religion,
43 psychology,44 sociobiology,45
40 See infra Section IV.C.
41 See infra Section IV.D.
42 Carol M. Rose, The Moral Subject of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1897, 1913 (2007)
("Philanthropy is not so far removed from involuntary redistribution, either, at least for ... a
practitioner of Middling Morality. She would like to give away something to alleviate the
troubles of the less fortunate, but she does not want to be a sucker about it and be the only one. If
others feel the same way, a requirement of mandated redistribution reassures the participants and
becomes an entirely plausible outcome in a regime that protects private property."); Voluntarism,
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITTANICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/voluntarism-philosophy
[https://penna.cc/8869-SRNK] ("Voluntarism... [is] any metaphysical or psychological system
that assigns to the will (Latin: voluntas) a more predominant role than that attributed to the
intellect.").
41 See, e.g., MARJO KAART1NEN, RELIGIOUS LIFE AND ENGLISH CULTURE IN THE REFORMATION
51 52, 62 (Palgrave 2002) ("In the case of individual religious, however, the ideal of poverty was
total, at least in theory. A monk, nun, canon, or friar was not allowed to own anything ...
Voluntary poverty was seen as an effective remedy for the sin of avarice . .. For everyone, land
held essential symbolic value: more than anything else, land symbolized bread and life itself...
If land was so important, why did people donate portions of their own share of the land to the
monasteries? The answer is simple: people wanted security in their life after death."); see
generally MIIAM FRENKEL & YAACOv LEV, CHARITY AND GIVING IN MONOTHEISTIC
RELIGIONS (2009) (describing medieval charity practices in the Christian, Islamic, and Jewish
worlds).
44 See, e.g., David J. Linden, This Is Your Brain on Charitable Giving, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Aug.
31, 2011), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-compass-pleasure/201108/is-your-
brain-charitable-giving [https://penna.cc/SLY9-34ZZ] (stating three theories on "how the brain's
pleasure circuit responded to differing approaches to giving and paying taxes," altruism the
pleasure in making one's own decision to give-and enhanced social status).
45 See, e.g., Thomas Dixon, Altruism: Social Psychology, Sociobiology, and Altruism Since the
1960s, SCI. ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://science.jrank.org/pages/8255/Altruism-Social-Psychology-
Sociobiology-Altmism-since-1960s.html [https://penna.cc/4H3Y-LY7D] (describing various
views on "how self-sacrificing individuals could ever have been successful in the merciless
struggle for existence").
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political science and public administration,46 and economics.47 Integrating
those wider ideas into a discussion of groundwater pumping restrictions is
beyond the scope of this article and are for the most part left to other authors
and articles. Moreover, while voluntary attempts to reducing groundwater
pumping can be found elsewhere, such as India,48 we limit ourselves here to
some examples found in the United States.
II. THE EDWARDS AQUIFER VISPO PROGRAM IN TEXAS
A. Introduction
From 1950-1956, the Edwards Aquifer region in Texas, shown in Figure
1, experienced its most severe drought in recorded time.49 As a result, Comal
Springs, the largest natural discharge point in the system, ceased flowing from
June 13 to November 3 of 1956.50 For the next sixty years, unresolved conflict
over the management of the Aquifer persisted and was made more complicated
with the Congressional passage of the Endangered Species Act (ESA),51 the
listing of several aquatic species at Comal Springs and San Marcos Springs,
46 See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1st ed. 1990) [hereinafter OSTROM, GOVERNING THE
COMMONS].
" See, e.g., Markus Pasche, What Can be Learnedfrom Behavioral Economics for Environmental
Policy?, in NEW PERSPECTIVES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES THROUGH BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS 109, 109 26 (Frank Beckenbach & Walter Kahlenborn eds., 2016).
48 See, e.g., V. Ratna Reddy et al., Groundwater Governance: A Tale of Three Participatory
Models in Andhra Pradesh, India, 7 WATER ALTERNATIVES 275, 293 (2014), http://www.water-
alternatives.org/index.php/alldoc/articles/vol7/v7issue2/247-a7-2-1/ [https://perna.cc/ZJ9U-F385
] (discussing programs of the Andhra Pradesh Farmer-Managed Ground-water Systems
(APFAMGS), Social regulations in Water Management at the Community Level (SRWM), and
the Andhra Pradesh Drought Adaption Initiative Project (APDAI), and concludes that "[while
the] 'do-it-yourself' approach with relatively better scientific or technical inputs has clearly
improved the awareness of the well owners... and has helped in checking further expansion of
groundwater development among the existing well owners, it has failed to check the growth of
new bore wells ... [and] ... has also failed to encourage other conservation practices ... [due in
part] . . .because the regulations are infornal in the form of peer pressure and voluntary .. ").
The APFAMGS claims to have achieved voluntary cuts in groundwater use by farmers through
farmer groundwater schools in several villages, though studies show that the achievement was
just limited to farmers doing groundwater monitoring. Id.; E-mail from Dr. Dinesh Kumar, Exec.
Dir., Institute for Resource Analysis and Policy (IRA), Hyderabad, India, to John C. Peck (May 8,
2016, 20:13 CST) (on file with author). Dr. Tushaar Shah of the International Water Management
Institute (IWMI), stated, "[n]o, I have scouted but found no evidence on voluntary reduction in
groundwater abstractions in India or elsewhere ... [and, while] ... [i]n Andhra Pradesh, a World
Bank-FAO program has organized farmers in 700 villages for voluntary reduction in pumping...
[that was] ... much talked about for some years ... a study we had conducted two years after the
funders withdrew concluded that there was really no change." E-mail from Dr. Shah, Senior
Fellow, Int'l Water Mgmt. Inst., to John C. Peck (May 3, 2016, 06:39 CST) (on file with author).
49 RECON ENVTL., INC. ET AL., EDWARDS AQUIFER RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM:
HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN 3-12 (2012) [hereinafter HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN],
https://www.edwardsaquifer.net/pdf/Final HCP.pdf [perma.cc/3PQT-3338].
50 Id. at 3-47.
51 Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531 1544 (West 1973).
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which are fed by water naturally emanating from the Aquifer, and a confusing
framework of water law governing groundwater.
To deal with management problems in the Edwards Aquifer, in 1993, the
Texas legislature created the Edwards Aquifer Authority (EAA) to control
pumping and achieve ESA compliance. In turn, the EAA has developed two
springflow-protection programs: the VISPO and the Aquifer Storage and
Recovery (ASR) leasing program.5 2 This part of the article provides
information on the hydrology of the Edwards Aquifer, briefly summarizes
some historical aspects of Texas groundwater law, shows how the ideas for the
programs evolved, and describes the VISPO program.
B. The Edwards Aquifer-Like No Other
Unlike the aquifers of Kansas, which for the most part consist of
"unconsolidated deposits of sand, gravel, silt, and clay . . . formed by the
sediments ... deposited by streams in bedrock valleys,"53 the Edwards Aquifer
in south central Texas is a karst limestone aquifer with many unique
qualities.54 The USGS explains that "karst hydrogeology is typified by a
network of interconnected fissures, fractures and conduits emplaced in a
relatively low-permeability rock matrix."55 In general, one could say that a
karst aquifer is more free-flowing through rock, while the Kansas aquifers are
located in sand and gravel deposits. The highly transmissive Edwards Aquifer
discharges water through springs.5 6 In contrast, if the Kansas aquifer is
associated with a river or stream (an alluvial aquifer), the aquifer can discharge
into the stream in periods of low flow.
57
52 HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN, supra note 49, at 3-14.
" Ground-Water Occurrence, KAN. GEOLOGICAL SURV. (Jan. 2005), http://www.kgs.ku.edu/
Publications/Bulletins/ED 10/04_occur.html [https://penua.cc/8HQ7-GAKC].
54 HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN, supra note 49, at 3-32.
55 Karst, BROADCAST AUDUBON, https://www.thesustainabilitycouncil.org/karst.html (last up-
dated Feb. 10, 2014) [https://perma.cc/M4RC-8942] (quoting the USGS).
5 6 Edwards (Balcones Fault Zone) Aquifer, TEX. WATER DEV. BOARD, http://www.twdb.texas.
gov/grundwater/aquifer/majors/edwards-bfz.asp [https://penna.cc/9HSY-EDKG].
57 KAN. GEOLOGICAL SURV., Ground-Water Occurrence, supra note 53.
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Edwards Aquifer
Regon'
Figure 1 - The Edwards Aquifer Region
The Edwards Aquifer (hereinafter, the "Aquifer") is approximately 180
miles long (east to west) and has a width varying from five to forty miles
(north to south). The Aquifer is bounded both to the east and the west by
subsurface groundwater divides. To the north, the Aquifer begins where
formations outcrop into the recharge zone within the Edwards Plateau. The
southern extent of the Aquifer is marked by the "bad water line," also referred
to as the saline-water line or fresh-water/saline-water interface, a best estimate
of a line marking the interface where total dissolved solids concentrations
reach 1,000 milligrams per liter.58 The flow in the Aquifer is generally west to
east and north.5 9 The Aquifer could be an icon for karst aquifers with its
numerous sinkholes and solution cavities visible on the surface, as well as
phenomenal flow velocities in the subsurface. While sand and gravel aquifers
vary in flow from one foot per year to one foot per day,'6 0 most karst aquifers
flow from tens of meters per day to approximately 1 ,600 meters (-one mile)
per day. Tracer tests by the EAA have confirmed flow velocities of 5,000
meters per day.6'
The Aquifer is home to the largest reported artesian flowing well in the
world, the Catfish Farm well, measured at a free-flowing rate of approximately
58HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN, supra note 49, at 3-3710o -38.
19 Id at 3 -34.
10 THOgAS CECH, PRINCIPLES OF WATER RESOURCES 126-28 (3d ed. 2010).
61 STEVE JOHNSON ET AL., TRACING GROUNDWATER FLOW PATHS IN THE EDWARDS AQUIFER
RECHARGE ZONE, PANTHER SPRINGS CREEK BASIN, NORTHERN BEXAR COUNTY TEXAS iii
(2010), https://www.edwardsaquifer.org/wp-content/uploads/20 19/02/2010-Johnson-etal-Panther
SpringsFlowpaths.pdf [https://penna.cc/HJG8-TG7L].
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37,000 gallons per minute (g.p.m.). When the operation was closed in 1991
due to discharge of massive levels of fecal coliform into the adjacent Medina
River, the effect was remarkable; despite very minimal rainfall in the San
Antonio area, the water level in the J-17 index well, nearly eighteen miles
away, rose approximately three feet in a week and continued to rise.
62
Average annual rainfall in San Antonio from 1871 to 2010, was 29.12
inches; from 1981 to 2010, it was 32.22 inches per year.63 On an annual basis,
rainfall varies widely. The porous nature of the Aquifer allows water to
recharge and to drain quickly. Annual recharge to the Aquifer since the 1930s
ranges from a low of 43,700 acre-feet in 1956 to a high of 2,485,700 acre-feet
in 1992.64 The long-term, from 1934 to 2014, median value for annual recharge
is 556,100 acre-feet.65 Due to drought years between 2005 and 2014, however,
the annual recharge median during that period was 508,000 acre-feet.
66
C. Development of Texas Groundwater Law and Creation of the EAA
Water regulation in Texas is fragmented. Surface water is subject to the
Appropriation Doctrine6' and governed by the State. Groundwater regulation is
quite different. Texas is the last bastion of the Rule of Capture.68 Early in the
twentieth Century, the Texas Supreme Court decided the tort case Houston and
T.C. Railroad Co. v. East.69 East, a resident of Denison, Texas, furnished water
to his home from a small domestic well on his property.70 The company owned
nearby property and needed water for its steam locomotives, so the company
drilled a well with significantly more capacity than the East well. 7 1 Production
in the East well began to decline.72 East sued for damages.7' The Supreme
Court found for the company and established the Rule of Capture for Texas.
74
The court's decision was based on two basic principles: the court didn't
62 Rick Iligner, The Edwards Aquifer: Political Prisoner, Address at the 89th Annual Meeting of
the Association of American Geographers (Apr. 1993).
63 AustinSan Antonio, TX, NAT'L WEATHER SERV. FORECAST OFF., https://w2.weather.gov/
climate/index.phpwfo=ewx [penna.cc/5RC3-JXLE].
64 See ROBIN L. TREMALLO ET AL., EDWARDS AQUIFER AUTHORITY HYDROLOGIC DATA




67 TEx. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 11.002 (West 1999) (establishing that right is acquired by
appropriation); TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 11.027 (West 1977) (establishing priority rule).
68 TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.002 (West 1997) ("The legislature recognizes that a landowner
owns the water beneath the surface of the landowner's land as real property.").
69 Houston & Tex. Cent. Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279 (Tex. 1904).
70 TEX. WATER DEV. BD., 100 YEARS OF RULE OF CAPTURE: FROM EAST TO GROUNDWATER
MANAGEMENT REPORT 63 (William F. Mullican, III & Suzanne Schwartz eds., 2004),
https://www.twdb.texas.gov/publications/reports/numbered reports/doc/R361/R361 .pdf
[penna.cc/R93R-SLBP]; East, 81 S.W. at 280.
71 See East, 81 S.W. at 280.
72 d.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 281-82.
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understand, nor did the judges think anyone could make sense of, what
happens beneath the surface of the earth, and the court didn't want to impede
development." More recently, the Texas Supreme Court has again upheld the
Rule of Capture.6
The East court, however, offered a small measure of hope by inviting the
Legislature to act: "[i]n the absence ... of positive authorized legislation, as
between proprietors of adjoining lands, the law recognizes no correlative rights
in respect to underground waters percolating, oozing, or filtrating through the
earth... ." -77 From 1905 through 1917, Texas experienced several intermittent
severe droughts, the most severe being in 1917.78 As a result, the legislature
accepted the invitation of the East court in 1917 by enacting the Conservation
Amendment of the Constitution.7 9 The amendment dedicated all natural
resources to the state and declared that the "[l]egislature shall pass all such
laws as may be appropriate thereto."8U0 Thirty years later, the legislature passed
the Texas Underground Water Conservation Act of 1949,1 which enabled the
creation of local groundwater conservation districts (GCDs), which could
adopt and enforce rules regarding the management and regulation of
groundwater.8 2 Thus, "GCDs are the preferred method of regulating
groundwater in Texas," 83 and management of groundwater is left to locally
created groundwater districts.
Texas shares a common trait with other states regarding water policy:
droughts are drivers of water actions, or reactions. For south-central Texas, the
drought of the 1950s is the drought of record. In response to the cessation of
measured flow at Comal Springs for several months in 1956, the legislature
acted with a bill creating the Edwards Underground Water District (EUWD),
the fourth GCD created in Texas.8 4 However, it was unique in the fact that it
was the first GCD created without the authority to promulgate and enforce
rules-a shortcoming that would ultimately lead to its demise.8 5 Nearly three
decades after its establishment in 1987, the legislature gave the EUWD two
regulatory powers: to regulate water produced from the Aquifer and
transported out of the district and implement a drought conservation plan.86
75 1d.
76 See Sipriano v. Great Springs Water of Am., 1 S.W.3d 75, 75 (Tex. 1999).
77 East, 81 S.W. at 280 (quoting Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294 (Ohio 1861)) (emphasis
added); see also TEx. WATER DEV. BD., supra note 70, at 65 (including more information about
the Texas history of the Rule of Capture).
78 TEX. WATER DEV. BD., supra note 70, at 2, 8.
79 TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 59.
80 Id.
81 1949 Tex. Gen. Laws 559.
82 Id.
83 Mary Sahs, Water Rights: Law Attorney, Presentation of "Groundwater 101" (2009); see TEX.
WATER CODE ANN. § 36.0015 (West 2015).
84 Illgner, supra note 62.
85 Id.
86 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 241. Western agricultural interests in Medina and Uvalde Counties were
leery about the consequences of drought rules; consequently, these counties managed to negotiate
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Congressional passage of the ES) in 1973,8 although an indirect action,
has played a very significant role in management of the Aquifer. Soon after
Congress enacted the ESA, aquatic species in both Comal Springs and San
Marcos Springs were listed as endangered.88 More species were added over
time.8 9 In early May 1991, the citizens of San Antonio voted to halt
construction on the Applewhite Reservoir, the first alternative water source for
the City other than the Aquifer.9° In a suit filed by the Sierra Club regarding
lack of protection for endangered species at Comal and San Marcos springs, a
federal district judge warned in his findings for the plaintiff that, if the
legislature failed to act in the 1993 session and pass meaningful legislation for
the regulation of the Aquifer that would lead to protection for the species, he
would allow the plaintiffs to come back to the court for additional relief 9 1
In a seismic paradigm shift in Texas groundwater management, the Texas
Legislature responded by passing the EAA Act in 1993,92 which enabled
creation of a new entity-the EAA-to replace the EUWD. The enabling
legislation included the following aspects and directives: (1) the total volume
(in acre-feet) of permits that can be issued; (2) guaranteed minimums for each
permit category; (3) a requirement that permits be based on historical use with
a defined historical period; (4) a filing deadline for permit claims and
applications of six months from the start-up date of the EAA; (5) a requirement
that all permitted wells be metered; (6) requirements that the EAA have
lifetime responsibility for meter costs for irrigation wells, a drought plan, and a
conservation plan; and (7) the appointment of a watchdog group representing
the interests on the Guadalupe River.9 The Act abolished the EUWD, and it
drew distinctions between the EUWD and the new EAA.
94
The EAA is unique. The Texas Legislature created the EAA in 1993 to
an option to vote themselves out of the district, which resulted in these counties withdrawing in
1989. See id.
87 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531 1541 (West 1973).
88 Species by County Report, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERv., https://ecos.fws.gov/
ecpO/reports/species-by-current-range-countyfips=48091 [perma.cc/2F64-N287].
89 Id.
9' Bruce Davidson- Applewhite Project Controversy Not Over Despite Voter Mandate, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (May 6, 1991), http://nl.newsbank.com/nl-search/we/Archives?pjprod
uct-SAEC&p theme=saec&paction search&pmaxdocs=200&s dispstring-applewite%/o20A
NDo2Odate(5/1/19910o20too205/6/1991)&p field date-0=YMDdate&pjparams date-0=date
:B,E&p text -date-0=5/l/1991%20to%205/6/199 )&p field advanced-0=&p-text -advanced-0=
(applewhite)&xcal numdocs=50&pjperpage=25&psort=YMD date:D&xcal useweights=no
[https://penna.cc/G3CT-Z4GD].
91 See Sierra Club v. Lujan, No. MO 91 CA-069, 1993 WL 151353, at *34 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 1,
1993).
92 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2350.
9' 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2358 2370.
9' 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2368. For example, the EUWD received revenue from ad valorem
property taxes, whereas the EAA's revenue is derived from user fees paid by permit holders. See
id. The EUWD was governed by a twelve-member elected board, while the EAA is governed by a
nine-member appointed board. See id. Legal issues raised by the Texas Department of Justice led
to a legislative change for the EAA in 1995 a 15-member elected board. See id.
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manage the Aquifer through a permitting system to control pumping and
achieve ESA compliance, thereby avoiding federal intervention.
95 Start-up of
the EAA was delayed because of United States Department of Justice concerns
regarding replacing an elected board with an appointed board until the issue
could be remedied during the 1995 Legislative Session.
96
However, before the legislation became effective on September 1, 1995,
several parties representing conventional conservative groundwater rights
interests filed a lawsuit, Barshop v. Medina Underground Water Conservation
District, against the EAA. 97 The plaintiffs challenged the constitutional
legitimacy of the EAA based on some of the directives listed above,
specifically those that the permitted groundwater withdrawals would be limited
and would be based on documented historical use.98 They alleged that the
permit limits would be consumed by the historical claims, meaning that the
remainder of landowners would be eliminated from obtaining water use
permits, unless such uses were acquired from holders of initial permits.99 In
June 1996, the Texas Supreme Court held that "[t]he specific provisions of the
Act, such as the grandfathering of existing users, the caps on water
withdrawals, and the regional powers of the Authority, are all rationally related
to legitimate state purposes in managing and regulating this vital resource."'
100
The original act stipulated that the maximum quantity of water held by the
initial regular permits could not exceed 450,000 acre-feet through December
31, 2007 and was to be reduced to 400,000 acre-feet beginning on January 1,
2008.101
The volume of water requested in the original claims for permits
following the filing deadline of December 30, 1996, was greater than 830,000
acre-feet,10 2 the first clue that the legislative 450,000 acre-feet limit was
problematic. Under the enabling act, the EAA was responsible for any
expenses related to achieving a total permit quantity to 450,000 acre-feet.
Within a few years of processing permit applications, it was thus clear that
there were at least 100,000 acre-feet of permits that qualified for water rights
above the 450,000 acre-feet cap. The EAA was looking at a one-time expense
of more than $200 million and a thirty-year total bond payment of twice that
amount.1 3 Furthermore, funds to pay for a massive condemnation had to come
95 See generally Sierra Club, 1993 WL 151353; Joe N. Patoski, The Edwards Aquifer & the E1,
EDWARDS AQUIFER AUTHORITY, https://www.edwardsaquifer.org/eaa/istory
[https://penna.cc/Y9B9-XDNH].
96 Gregg Eckhardt, Laws and Regulations Applicable to the Edwards Aquifer, EDWARDS
AQUIFER WEBSITE, https://www.edwardsaquifer.net/rules.html [https://penna.cc/L7HE-5LN9].
97 Barshop v. Medina Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 623 (Tex. 1996).
981d. at 630.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 633.
101 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2364.
102 Interview by Rick IlIgner with Steve Walthour, Program Manager Permits Team, Edwards
Aquifer Auth. (Nov. 2003).
103 Id.
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only from the people who would lose their water rights.104 In short, the region
would be paying over $400 million (the approximate total payout over the
thirty-year period) to affect pumping restrictions on water rights established by
documented use and then have to fork over much more than that to replace the
water just lost.'0 5
In 2007, the legislature passed the most significant changes to the EAA
since passage of the original legislation in 1993. The legislature (1)
permanently raised the penuit cap to 572,000 acre-feet; (2) made drought
restrictions part of the Act, rather than being subject to implementation through
adoption and enforcement of rules; and (3) directed the EAA to participate in a
"recovery implementation program" (RIP) with several other interested parties
to develop a resolution to the pending ESA issue by December 2012.106 In
March 2013, the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (USFWS) approved the
Edwards Aquifer Habitat Conservation Plan (EAHCP), which consists of two
components: (1) Restoration, Minimization, and Mitigation measures-
activities to enhance and protect the habitats and species-and (2) Flow
Protection measures to maintain minimum springflows. 107
One of the Flow Protection measures is the VISPO, a program in which
the EAA compensates irrigations for participating in the program and provides
additional compensation for suspending irrigation during certain severe
drought conditions.10 8 The second Flow Protection measure is the ASR leasing
program, which involves acquiring water rights and either using the water to
fill the ASR facility operated by the San Antonio Water System (SAWS), or
forbearing use of the rights during certain drought conditions.10 9 While the
ASR leasing program is the keystone of the springflow protection measures of
the Habitat Conservation Plan,"0 only VISPO is described in this article.
104 Id. The only means of funding for the EAA is a permit fee charged to permit holders. The
agency receives no state funding and cannot levy a tax. Consequently, funds for the
condemnation, or retirement, would come only from the permit holders. This situation is
completely different than the normal condemnation process carried out in a city when widening a
street, in which the funds for the civil works project are not the burden solely of the persons along
the designated stretch of road.
105 Id. In 2006, EAA water rights were selling for $5,000/acre-foot. So, if a small municipality
was going to have 100 acre-feet of water rights retired, the EAA would have to come up with
$500,000 to compensate that municipality (100 acre-feet x $5,000/acre-foot). However, a State
Water Planning initiative that was proceeding concurrently with the EAA adjudication process
and charged with following a rigorous analytical process to insure the water needs of all water
user groups (excepting irrigators) were met had evaluated many water management strategies for
the municipal and industrial users, and the very cheapest was over $1,000/acre-foot for a 30-year
bond-payment term. This meant that the same municipality that was compensated $5,000 for
water it lost had to replace it with water that cost $30,000, at a minimum. So, this was a good
example of "lose/lose."
106 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 5902.
107 HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN, supra note 49, at 2-16.
108 Id. at 5-3 to -5.
109 Id. at 5-37.
110 Id. at 5-38. It is the keystone for two reasons. Id. First, when water stored in the ASR is
recovered, direct withdrawals from the Edwards Aquifer are reduced. Id. Second, when water is
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D. The VISPO Program
The concept of the VISPO is simple: provide financial incentives to
reduce pumping."' "Voluntary" and "suspension" are key words in the
program name. Voluntary is paramount; the reductions in usage required for
the program are completely voluntary and come with financial incentives.
Suspension describes the nature of the reduction; it is a suspension rather than
a lease. The difference is significant because of the nature of EAA water rights.
Of the three permit categories-municipal, industrial, and irrigation-
municipal and industrial water rights are considered "unrestricted," which
means that there are no restrictions on the marketing of the rights. Irrigators
have generally received a water right for two acre-feet/acre on a maximum
number of acres irrigated in any single year.112 However, the EAA Act
stipulates that irrigation rights are divided in two: one-half is unrestricted and
can be marketed just like municipal or industrial water rights; the other half is
referred to as a "base irrigation right," which must be conveyed with the sale of
the land."' It can be leased for a term not to exceed ten years but only for
irrigation. 114 Demand for unrestricted water rights is significantly greater than
demand for base irrigation rights, which results in a marked difference in their
marketing value. Consequently, paying an irrigator to suspend use of the
irrigator's water rights to aid in springflow allows enrollment of both irrigation
water right categories.
Because irrigators are besieged with variables and elements out of their
control, it was imperative that the basic VISPO concept be clear and
unambiguous. Deciding on a trigger index and the date of the trigger event
were first order events. Choosing an index that would trigger suspension was
straight forward; it was the J-17 index well in San Antonio." 5 For decades it
has been generally considered (except by residents of Uvalde County) to be the
index well for the Aquifer. It tracts with flow at Comal Springs and is
mentioned on nearly every TV news cast and in the daily paper. The two
paramount factors for the date of the trigger event were to give the irrigator
sufficient notice to make alternative plans for the upcoming crop year, but not
to trigger too soon, only to have substantial rainfall after the event, which
would complicate the issue. October 1 ended up as the best choice, and a level
recovered under the ASR program, the SAWS has agreed to reduce its authorized amount in an
amount equal to the recovered amount. Id. For example, if SAWS is authorized 100,000 acre-feet
and 10,000 acre-feet of Habitat Conservation Plan water is withdrawn during a year in which the
annual drought reduction is twenty-five percent, SAWS would be allowed to use only 65,000
acre-feet of its permitted amount (100,000 acre-feet minus twenty-five percent of 100,000 acre-
feet minus 10,000 acre-feet = 65,000 acre-feet)). Id.
"I RECON ENVTL., INC. ET AL., EDWARDS AQUFER RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM:
HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN: APPENDIX 0 3 (2012) [hereinafter HABITAT CONSERVATION
PLAN: APPENDIX 0].
112 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2361.
13 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2366.
114 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2362.
115 HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN: APPENDIX 0, supra note 111, at 8.
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of 635 feet above mean sea level (msl) was the trigger.1 16 In summary, if the
Aquifer level at J-17 on October 1 was at or below 635 feet msl, a VISPO
participant would have to suspend pumping all the water enrolled for the
following calendar year.
The remaining program elements requiring determination were how much
to enroll, for what periods, and what price to pay. The EAA initially chose
20,000 acre-feet to enroll, then later doubled the goal to 40,000 acre-feet.
117
The next step was developing the terms and rates. One of the principles that
factored in the decision to set terms was confidence that something would
happen-the USFWS required that the action be "reasonably certain to occur."
Consequently, five- and ten-year options were chosen."8 Regarding rates, one
irrigator said we needed "shock and aw" on rates to assure meaningful
participation." 9 The schedule developed included an annual "stand-by" rate
just for being in the program and a "suspension" rate if irrigators had to forego
pumping.2 0 As the following rate table demonstrates, the payment schedule is
skewed in favor of the ten-year program; enrolling in the five-year program for
consecutive terms would yield less money than enrolling in a single ten-year
term, assuming equal aquifer conditions. The icing on the cake is that during a
suspension year when enrollees give up their water, they receive both
payments.
Term Fee 1 2 3 4 5
(S)/AF (S)/AF (S)/AF (S)/AF (S)/AF
Stand-by 50.00 50.75 51.51 52.28 53.06
5-Yr
Suspension 150.00 152.25 154.53 156.84 159.18
Stand-by 57.50 57.50 57.50 57.50 57.50
10-Yr
Suspension 172.50 172.50 172.50 172.50 172.50
116 Id. at 10.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Rick IlIgner, Edwards Aquifer Recovery Implementation Program VISPO Workgroup (Apr.
1993).
120 HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN: APPENDIX 0, supra note 11, at 6.
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Term Fee 6 7 8 9 10




Stand-by 70.20 70.20 70.20 70.20 70.20
10-Yr
Suspension 210.60 210.60 210.60 210.60 210.60
Figure 2 - Payment Schedules for the 5- and 10-Year VISPO Enrollment
The payment schedules were significant enough to promote optimism
towards the program.12 1 It was always the intent of the work group that, except
when suspension is required, VISPO should not interfere in any way with
irrigators going about their business. Consequently, a few bonuses were added
to the slate: (1) irrigators could enroll any portion of their permit and weren't
required to enroll the full permit; (2) if an irrigator enrolled a portion of the
permit and then realized the possibility of over-pumping the remaining portion,
the necessary water could be transferred to cover the shortage; and (3) in a
non-suspension year, participants could lease out their enrolled water and still
get a stand-by payment.1
22
The following is an example of how the program and finances work. In
this example, two hypothetical irrigators are illustrated. Irrigator A has a 200-
acre-foot water right and 100 acre-feet enrolled in VISPO. Irrigator B has a
175-acre-foot water right and 100 acre-feet enrolled in VISPO. The table
below shows what each irrigator would receive financially for the first year in
the VISPO program.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 10.
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Irrigator Term Fee Payment No Trigger Trigger(Year 1)
Stand-by $50.00 $5,000.00 $5,000.00
A 5-year Suspension $150.00 $15,000.00
Total 1 $5,000.00 $20,000.00
Stand-by $57.50 $5,750.00 $5,750.00
B 10-year Suspension $172.50 $17,250.00
Total $5,750.00 $23,000.00
Figure 3 - Illustration of the VISPO Program
In the example, if VIPSO were not triggered, Irrigator A would receive
$5,000, while Irrigator B would receive $5,750, and both parties would retain
access to their full water rights (A - 200 acre-feet, B - 175 acre-feet). If
VISPO were triggered, Irrigator A would receive $20,000, while Irrigator B
would receive $23,000. However, in this instance, Irrigator A has access to the
remaining 100 acre-feet of the water right and Irrigator B has access to the
remaining seventy-five acre-feet of the water right.
The Service approved the EAHCP in March 2013, and enrollment
solicitation began.123 Activity was brisk in 2013 and 2014, with a final
enrollment figure by the end of 2014 of 40,921 acre-feet, 900 acre-feet over the
original goal, this additional quantity estimated to increase spring flow of more
than one cubic feet per second.124 Over this two-year period, enrollment
numbers were influenced by drought and commodity prices. 125 The economic
impact of VISPO since inception has been rather emarkable as evidenced by
Figure 4 below. Payments from 2014 to 2019 totaled more than $18.8 million.
123 Edwards Aquifer Habitat Conservation Plan (E4HCP), CITY NEW BRAUNFELS, https://www.
nbtexas.org/1867/Habitat-Conservation-Plan [https://penna.cc/PT6V-AKAU]; SHAUN PAYNE &
BOB HALL, UPDATE ON THE EDWARDS AQUIFER HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN: GUADALUPE
RIVER BASIN 2015 CLEAN RIVERS PROGRAM STEERING COMMITTEE MEETING 2 (2015),
https://www.gbra.org/documents/crp/meefings/2015/EdwardsAquiferHabitatConservationPlan.pd
f [https://penna.cc/NEC9-EFLD].
12 4EAA Timeline, EDWARDS AQUIFER AUTHORITY, https://www.edwardsaquifer.org/eaa/istory/
eaa-timeline/ [https://penna.cc/9XL9-EWPW].
125 RICK ILLGNER, USING FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR AQUIFER MITIGATION: TEXAS ALLIANCE
OF GROUNDWATER DISTRICTS 13 (2015), http://www.iemshows.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/0
3/2015-TGS-Presentation-Rick-Illgner.pdf [https://penna.cc/Y8XY-ZQQN]; EDWARDS AQUIFER
HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN: 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 36 37 (2019), https://www.edwards
aquifer.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/EAHCPAnnual Report 2018.pdf [https://penna.cc/VL
9V-Y4GW].
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Figure 4 - VISPO Enrollment and Payments 2014-2019
E. Summary
In summary, the history of the EAA has been a long and winding road,
beginning with a lawsuit involving the ESA and a constitutional challenge to
the enabling act, moving through years of developing on-the-fly rules and
administrative protocol, ultimately concluding with an EAHCP complicated by
physical and political circumstances. Through the process, permit holders have
evolved from considering the EAA as an adversary, to considering the EAA
warily, and ultimately to viewing the EAA as a partner. The utilization of
financial incentives to reach the biologic goals of the EAHCP is a major
reason.
III. LOCAL COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS IN THE WEST: THREE CASE STUDIES
A. Introduction
In response to the threat of state curtailments, several western
communities have sought new options for groundwater governance and used
novel approaches to address issues in their aquifers. This portion of the paper
will describe three examples, one successful, one not yet successful and the
third still in its formative stages, from the western United States of new
groundwater governance structures using voluntary, participatory methods: the
RGWCD in Colorado, the Umatilla Basin Water Commission (UBWC) in
Oregon, and the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA) in
California modeled after the voluntary Orange County Water District
(OCWD).
Unlike surface water governance in the West, some groundwater
governance models appear to be developing with a focus on local planning and
management. Surface water governance is often regulated by a central state
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authority applying a standard permitting system across the state. 126 Each river
may have individual planning, limiting use to maintain minimum stream flows,
or other policies decided by the state agency. For groundwater, some states
have implemented a similar approach by limiting aquifer use to SAYs127 or
designating special areas of additional groundwater regulation. Other states
have used a "wait-and-see" approach, allowing the individual groundwater
users to litigate their own rights as conflicts appear. Even with these varying
state policy approaches, groundwater users have sought to have local
management of their underlying aquifers and formed organizations to improve
groundwater management i  their aquifers.
In the three examples that follow, a common narrative emerges-placing
more control and decision making at the local level. Some key features may
represent an emerging trend in groundwater governance. Each case began with
a groundwater and availability issue preventing the existing level of use to
continue. Next, local communities voluntarily, or by necessity, come together
to address the challenges groundwater users face collectively. Next, the local
community attempts to achieve legal changes to enable a certain level of local
control. Finally, a local groundwater resource management organization forms
and attempts to carry out a plan developed by that organization. These factors
can be seen in the three case studies, but they vary by the differing legal
pressure to address groundwater overuse imposed by state law. These
regulatory environments limit how voluntarily and independently the
groundwater users organize and manage groundwater in their basin.
The lowest level of state pressure creates an organizational environment
of theoretical, unused, or threatened state administrative restrictions. This level
represents the more voluntary governance environment, which can be seen in
the Rio Grande Water Conservation District. The next level of state pressure
takes the form of an official government recognition of a groundwater problem
and imposed restrictions in individual uses in a region, but without mandating
water use planning or collective aquifer management, illustrated by Oregon's
Umatilla Basin Water Commission. The final, least voluntary level is one in
which the state mandates planning and the creation of a groundwater
organization and sets a target consumption level. The final level is represented
by the yet-to-be-created groundwater agencies created in California's SGMA.
The case studies show differing levels of state pressure and illustrate how
voluntarily the local community created the organization.
Often groundwater issues describe how aquifers represent an archetypal
example of the tragedy of the commons, which suggests that rational
maximizers with access to a common-pool resource will eventually destroy the
resource. Since each user has unlimited access to the resource, as the resource
becomes scarcer, the users are incentivized to use the resource before it is
126 GETCHES ET AL., supra note 15.
127 Kalf & Woolley, supra note 16 at 296 97.
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totally gone.12 Attempts at collective effort would be undone by the problem
of free-riders that would benefit without contributing to the common effort. 1
29
With the uneven incentive both to use as much as possible and disincentive to
cooperate, theoretically aquifer organizations should never form. The typical
solutions offered to solve the tragedy of the commons are additional regulation
(requiring a mandatory reduction in access to the resource) or outright
privatization of the resource (legally challenging depending on the resource).
Less commonly suggested middle paths are "common" or "collective" property
regimes, whereby ownership is severed from the actual use of the resources,
which disrupts the public-private dichotomy.130 For groundwater, a choice
between potential takings claims'3' on one hand and unconstitutional
privatization12 on the other is the source of heated debates.
Somewhere between the two extremes is collective management of shared
groundwater resources. Ostrom's solution has similarities to the groundwater
organizations in the West Basin aquifer systems in the Los Angeles area that
were the topic of her doctoral dissertation.'33 Ostrom's explanation for aquifer
collective organization comes from a modification of the underlying
assumption of the tragedy of the commons: the rational maximizer.3 4 Instead
of a rational maximizer, Ostrom suggests that sharing information among
resource users through agreements could produce better resource governance
than regulating through central agencies.'35 The users of a common resource
can arrange for their own private enforcement mechanisms through private
agreements.36 These agreements determine both the allowable appropriation
and the incentives to achieve stable use of the common resource. 117 Successful
common pool resource organizations share some common principles identified
by Ostrom:38 participating in rules created by members, practicing self-
monitoring, adopting conflict resolution mechanisms, and obtaining approval
of government authorities to allow local rulemaking. 119
128 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 ScI. 1243, 1244 (1968).
12 9 
OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 46, at 6.
130 See generally EDWARD BARBANELL, COMMON-PROPERTY ARRANGEMENTS AND SCARCE
RESOURCES WATER IN THE AMERICAN WEST (2001); see also Ana M. Peredo et al., Common
Property: Uncommon Forms of Prosocial Organizing, 33 J. Bus. VENTURING 591, 592 (2018).
131 See Micah Green Rough Waters: Assessing the Fifth Amendment Implications of California's
Sustainable Groundwater ManagementAct, 47 U. PAC. L. REV. 25, 41 43 (2015).
112 Tuholske, supra note 20, at 227 (stating a fiduciary obligation may exist for states to regulate
groundwater for the benefit of the public).
133 See generally ELINOR OSTROM, PUBLIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP: A CASE STUDY IN GROUND
WATER BASIN MANAGEMENT (1965) [hereinafter OSTROM, PUBLIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP]
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles) (on file with Indiana
Digital Library of the Commons), http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/handle/10535/3581 [https://penn
a.cc/F3KG-DDUF].
134 OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 46, at 6 7.135 1d. at8 10,12 18.
136 Id. at 16.
137 Id. at 55 56.
138 Id. at 89 90.
139Id. at 100-01.
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This final principle, government recognition of local rules closely
resembles the need for governance to be voluntary. The "minimal recognition
of rights to organize" by the state can be the factor that decides if resource
governance will be successful.40 In the three following case studies, the local
groundwater users have created the legal tools that would eventually lead to
their groundwater organizations. For the first case study, the RGWCD in
Colorado lobbied the legislature to enable the creation of the district. A novel
use of intergovernmental agreements in the second case study provided the
legal authority for the creation of the UBWC in Oregon. In the final case study,
locally inspired legislation in California empowering the OCWD eventually
inspired the new SGMA's statewide-mandated organizations.
B. The RGWCD in Colorado
The voluntary efforts by irrigators to conserve groundwater in the San
Luis Valley of Colorado represents example organization with the least legal
pressure to organize included in this paper. The San Luis Valley is located in
the headwaters of the Rio Grande River. Groundwater in the valley provides an
important source of baseflow to the Rio Grande River, making groundwater
regulation in the San Luis Basin an important factor in meeting downstream
water users' rights and obligations to other downstream states.
The history of groundwater law in Colorado is typical of arid western
states using prior appropriation. The main influences on water use in the San
Luis Valley began in 1938, when the Rio Grande Compact attempted to
resolve disputes between Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, and Mexico.'4 ' The
compact resolved surface water allocations between these parties. 142 While the
compact did not address groundwater directly, the advent of modern pumping
technology in the 1940s radically changed irrigation in the region.143 Soon
after groundwater pumping became widespread, conflicts developed between
senior surface water users and junior groundwater pumpers. 144 In 1957,
Colorado passed the Ground Water Law, which required permits to drill new
wells, created the first groundwater commission, and tasked the commission
with regulating the declining groundwater resources. 145 Conflicts between
surface and groundwater users continued after the implementation of the new
law, leading to further revisions of the groundwater code. In 1965, Colorado
passed the Groundwater Management Act, which protected some areas from
claims that groundwater users were depleting surface allocations, separating
"tributary" groundwater from groundwater that does not interact with surface
140 OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 46, at 101, 178 81.
141 William A. Paddock, Rio Grande Compact of 1938, 5 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 1, 3 (2001).
142 Id. at 34.
143 Ari J. Stiller-Schulman, No Seat at the Water Table: Colorado's New Groundwater Basin
Statute Leaves Senior Surface Rights in the Lurch, 84 U. COLO. L. REv. 819, 829 (2013) (citing
Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986, 991 (Colo. 1968).144 Id. at 829 30.
145
1 d. at 829.
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waters.146 The presumption of non-injury in these regions could be overcome if
actual harm to surface users could be shown. 141 Unfortunately for many of the
groundwater users in the San Luis Valley, contributions from the aquifer
provided significant amounts of water to the baseflow of the Rio Grande River.
In 1966, Texas and New Mexico sued Colorado for failing to meet
obligations in the compact. 148 The State Engineer began curtailing groundwater
pumping in the San Luis Valley to provide adequate baseflow in the river.
149
Another attempt to compensate for baseflow losses, the Closed Basin Project,
hoped to capture evaporative losses but was ultimately unsatisfactory.150 In
response to the dispute, the state legislature created the RGWCD in 1967 as a
"sef-directed administrative unit.' 151 Among other responsibilities, the district
could levy taxes, contract with federal agencies, and represent he agricultural
water users in litigation. 152 Further, landowners that wish to coordinate water
management may form a "special improvement district.'
153
Drought conditions during the 2002 irrigation season increased pumping
in the region to offset losses from surface conditions.154 During this time,
storage in the aquifer fell 1 million acre feet.155 The loss of stored water was
also associated with losses of well yield and other aquifer production issues. 1
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The increase in pumping also reduced the baseflow into the Rio Grande River,
furthering the issues with meeting downstream interstate obligations under the
Rio Grande Compact, suggesting the State Engineer (administrator regulating
water resources in the state) would impose pumping reductions to meet the
obligations under the compact. With the groundwater situation becoming a
crisis, local irrigators turned to their state legislature to assist to provide legal
tools to help manage the situation and prevent the damage that would come
from state regulation of wells. 157
Irrigators needed a tool to collectively manage the aquifer, reduce
groundwater consumption, and prevent management disruption by unplanned
state curtailments. In 2004, a local farmer and state senator, Lewis Entz,
14 6Id. at 831.
147 Id. at 832.
148 Peter C. Johnson, The "Third Act" in Colorado Water Law: The Colorado Supreme Court
Affirms the Concept of Sustainable Optimum Use in Simson v. Cotton Creek Circles, LLC, 12 U.
DENy. WATERL. REv. 241, 244 (2008).
149 Id.
15 0Id. at 245.
151 Kelsey C. Cody et al., Emergence of Collective Action in a Groundwater Commons: Irrigators
in the San Luis Valley of Colorado, 28 SoC'Y & NAT. RES. 405, 414 (2015).
152 Id.
153 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-48-123(1) (West 2007).
154 See Cody et al., supra note 151, at 407.
155 Id.
156 Rio GRANDE WATER CONSERVATION DIST., PROPOSED PLAN OF WATER MANAGEMENT:
SPECIAL IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT No. 1 OF THE RIO GRANDE WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT
5 (2009), http://www.rgwcd.org/attachments/File/serviceplan-Amended Plan Water
Management Adopted 15Jun09_-B ODdate of approval.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HJX-VXKR].
157 See Cody et al., supra note 151, at 417.
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introduced Senate Bill 04-222.' The law prevented the State Engineer from
shutting down wells as long as those farmers were within a subdistrict and
under a management plan.'59 In 2006, a majority of the local irrigators voted to
voluntarily create Subdistrict No. 1, which formed the governing body for the
aquifer.160 Achieving a majority was a struggle and included a few staunch
opponents, but the subdistrict represents an uncommon attempt by a region to
secure a voluntary, regional, comprehensive groundwater governance
organization. 161
The first task of the subdistrict was to create a management plan to
sustainably provide water in the future and meet legal obligations in the Rio
Grande Compact.162 Management plans must be approved by the State
Engineer163 and a local court after a hearing of objections.164 Through this
process, the plan is amended until its ultimate approval.165 The State Engineer
uses specific factors to approve these plans, including maintaining the aquifer
at a sustainable level, accounting for fluctuations, and preventing interference
with the Rio Grande Compact.166 As long as the plan is approved and the
subdistrict follows the plan, the State Engineer cannot curtail groundwater
pumping.167 After review by the State Engineer and revisions suggested by the
trial court, the Subdistrict No. l's management plan was approved by Judge
Kuenhold in 2010168 and later affirmed by the Supreme Court of Colorado. 1
69
The plan's goal is to form an alternative to state regulation of
groundwater wells and the self-regulation of the aquifer basin using economic-
based incentives.170 Specifically, the plan hopes to restore hydrologic
conditions in the aquifer basin, prevent interference with surface water users,
and avoid violating the Rio Grande Compact.171 These goals would be
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 San Antonio, Los Pinos & Conejos River Acequia Pres. Ass'n v. Special Improvement Dist.
No. 1 of Rio Grande Water Conservation Dist., 270 P.3d 927, 933 (Colo. 2011).
161 See Cody et al., supra note 151, at 417.
162 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-501(4)(a) (West 2004).
163 See id.
164 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-48-126(3)(b) (West 2007).
165 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-48-126(4) (West 2007).
166 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-501(4)(a)(I) (V) (West 2004).
167 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-501(4)(c) (West 2004).
168 Rio GRANDE WATER CONSERVATION DIST., PLAN OF WATER MANAGEMENT: SPECIAL
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT No. 1 OF THE RIo GRANDE WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT 1 (2017),
https://rgwcd.org/attachnents/subdistrictl/Plan/ 20Revisions/Plan/o20Water%/o20Management o
20AMENDED%200o28efficiency%/o290%2OClean.pdf [https://penna.cc/444R-WSQV]; Matt
Hildner, San Luis Valley's Chief Judge to Step Down, PUEBLO CHIEFTAIN (June 4, 2011, 12:01
AM), https://www.chieftain.com/875bbb7c-8e60-1 leO-aa92-001cc4cOO2eO.htinl [https://penna.
cc/8QS5-QCAF].
169 San Antonio, Los Pinos & Conejos River Acequia Pres. Ass'n v. Special Improvement Dist.
No. 1 of Rio Grande Water Conservation Dist., 270 P.3d 927, 935 (Colo. 2011).
170 Id. at 941; see also RIO GRANDE WATER CONSERVATION DIST., PROPOSED PLAN OF WATER
MANAGEMENT, supra note 156, at 8.
171 See San Antonio, Los Pinos & Conejos River, 270 P.3d at 941.
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accomplished using financial incentives (abstraction taxes) to reduce pumping,
temporary fallowing of land, replacing stream depletions, and complete
retirement of some irrigated lands in the basin using the CREP with
supplemental payments derived from pumping fees.172 An annual replacement
plan is submitted to the State Engineer at the beginning of the irrigation
season, including forecasted streamflows, predicted loss of streamflows from
the previous year's pumping, total subdistrict depletions, and aquifer modeling
information. 17' The court retains jurisdiction for review of these annual
replacement plans in case any party wishes to challenge the terms of these
plans. 174
The plan initially imposed a forty-five dollar/acre-foot pumping tax in
2011, which was increased to seventy-five dollars after 2012. 171 The
imposition of the tax is associated with a thirty-two percent reduction in
groundwater consumption within the subdistrict.17 By 2015, 5,854 acres had
entered long-term fallowing contracts with CREP subsidized by the
subdistrict.177 Local farmers, however, indicate that compensation is less than
the forgone profits from planting their crops. 17 However, the positive results
may represent more than economic decisions and actually represent a shift in
social norms within the community. 179
Whether the reductions were due to the self-imposed tax or the voluntary
reduction in consumption to meet the goals of the subdistrict, this case study
provides evidence that these kinds of organizations can be effective
alternatives to state regulation. The key feature that the subdistrict represents a
self-imposed reduction in groundwater consumption, without top-down
coercion by a state agency.
C. Umatilla Basin Water Commission
The UBWC represents another example of a local, voluntary attempt to
regulate groundwater and curb unsustainable use with a moderate amount of
legal pressure to organize management. Umatilla, Oregon is located in the
northern portion of the state bordering the Columbia and Umatilla Rivers. 180
The region contains two distinct aquifers: a deeper basalt aquifer and a
shallower alluvial aquifer.""U The alluvial aquifer saw problematic drops in
172 Id.
171 
I d. at 943.
174 Id. at 944.
175 Steven M. Smith et al., Responding to a Groundwater Crisis: The Effects of SelfImposed
Economic Incentives, 4 J. ASS'N ENvTL. & RESOURCE ECONOMISTS 985, 990 (2017).
176 Id. at 1007.
177 Id. at 1009.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 1010.
180 
FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, FLOOD INSURANCE STUDY 9 (2009), http://www.co.umat
illa.or.us/planning/FIS/Umatilla%/o2OCounty%/020F1S%/02OPRELJM% o2OVoll.pdf [https://penna.cc
/UE5Q-GJM5].
181 OR. WATER RES. DEP'T GROUND WATER SECTION, GROUND WATER SUPPLIES IN THE
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL 'Y
water table levels in the 1970s, but was partially recovered after
implementation of surface infiltration project.'82 The deeper basalt aquifer was
more productive but also suffered from unsustainable depletions.'83 Because of
the declining groundwater levels, the Oregon Water Resources Department
(OWRD) passed "hotly contested" regulations designating parts of the region
as a "critical ground water area."'184 These designations allow OWRD to
suspend issuance of new water right permits in the area and restrict
pumping.'85 Groundwater pumping restrictions eliminated 127,000 acre feet of
permitted pumping to achieve the "SAY" in the basin.'86 Because of the
region's dependence on groundwater, the restrictions would slow or halt future
growth in the area.
In the 1980s, the community sought new options and flexibility to address
its groundwater issues. Governor Atiyeh created the Umatilla Basin
Groundwater Taskforce ("Taskforce") composed of citizens to provide policy
suggestions to address the groundwater issues in the area.'8 7 The Taskforce
suggested legal changes to enable artificial recharge of the aquifer, water basin
planning, and to create an organization to implement those
recommendations.' Matters came to a head in 2004, when the local planning
commission debated creating an overlay zone prohibiting any new domestic
groundwater development in the area.'8 9 Responding to the public outcry and
resistance, the planning commission and county commissioners created a new
taskforce, the Umatilla County Critical Groundwater Taskforce, to provide
options to address the county's groundwater crisis.190 By 2007, the new
taskforce had suggestions, including additional planning, an ASR project, and
regulatory changes to assist in that effort. 191
The proposed aquifer storage project would store winter flows of the
Columbia River in the aquifers for use in the summer months, assisting to
restore the aquifer storage levels and allow further well development.
192
UMATILLA BASIN 4 (2003), https://www.oregon.gov/OWRD/wrdreports/umatillagwwkshprpta
pril2003.pdf [https://perna.cc/89LZ-HQZF].
182 Id. at7.
183 Id. at? 8.
184 LAURA SCHROEDER, INNOVATIVE PARTNERSHIPS: AN ANSWER TO THE TRAGEDY OF THE
COMMONS 3 (2016), http://www.icid.org/wif2 fullpapers/wif2 w.1.3.02.pdf [https://penia.cc/6
6B5-XXBJ].
185 See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 537.742(2)(a) (f) (West 1991).
186 MARTHA PAGEL, OREGON'S UMATILLA BASIN AQUIFER RECHARGE AND BASALT BANK: A
CASE STUDY FOR THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WATER MARKETS PROJECT 5 (2016),
https://staticl.squarespace.com/static/56dle36d59827e6585c0b336/t/5805466815d5dbblab59a23
8/1476740731982/Oregon-Groundwater-Pagel.pdf [https://pema.cc/VB4P-97SW].
187 UMATILLA COUNTY CRITICAL GROUNDWATER TASK FORCE, UMATILLA SUB-BASIN 2050
WATER MANAGEMENT PLAN 15 (2008) [hereinafter 2050 PLAN], http://www.co.umatilla.or.us/pl
anning/pdf/20500% 20Plan%/ 20Final.pdf [https://penma.cc/47ZM-HGYV].
188 Id.
189 Id. at x.
190 Id.
191 PAGEL, supra note 186, at 6; see 2050 PLAN, supra note 187, at 50 53.
192 See Martha Pagel et al., New Water Management Model, WATER REP., May 2011, at 1, 2
Vol. XXIX: I
2019 PECK ETAL.: GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT 29
Infiltration basins would be utilized to partially clean the water entering the
alluvial aquifers, which could be later injected into the deeper basalt
aquifers.193 The storage project hoped to increase flows in the Umatilla River,
improve salmon habitat, and meet treaty obligations of the Umatilla Tribes. 1
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In 2008, OWRD and a private consulting agency conducted a preliminary
study of the aquifer's utility for water storage.195 After seeing promise for the
project, support grew for further investigation of the project.
In 2009, the Oregon State Legislature authorized House Bill 3369196 to
fund a further, more detailed study of the storage project in the Umatilla basin,
but also required that twenty-five percent of all water stored under the program
be dedicated to "net environmental benefits.' 197 The UBWC formed the same
year to serve as the central organization managing the project.198 The UBWC
was the result of an IGA between Umatilla and Marrow Counties, the
Westland Water District, and the Umatilla Tribes of the Umatilla Indian
Reservation.'99 ICAs can be formed under Oregon law between local
governments, tribes, and water districts.2 0 0 Oregon law allows the IGA to form
a new entity with representatives from the participating agencies and
governments.20 1 Under the IGA for the UBWC, it was able to manage "Stage
1" of the feasibility study and the funding provided by H.B. 3369.202 An IGA
allowed the UBWC to refine the project management plan and develop further
infrastructure as needed. By 2011, the UBWC had made significant progress
on studying the aquifer, acquiring licenses, and determining if the project
would be successful including meeting the critical twenty-five percent
requirement imposed on the grants provided in H.B. 3369.
2
01
Unfortunately, the project was not successful. The studies showed a
smaller amount of available aquifer storage than expected and increased costs
for infrastructure development.20 4 Additionally, legal inflexibility of the
UBWC and internal conflicts between UBWC members contributed to the
project's downfall.205 Further, the dedication of twenty-five percent of stored
water to environmental benefits amounted to a tax on all water development
[hereinafter Pagel et al., Management Model].
193 Id. at3.
194 PAGEL, supra note 186, at 5 7.
195 d. at 6 7.
196 H.R. 3369, 75th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009).
197 Pagel et al., Management Model, supra note 192, at 7.
198 Id. at3.
199 Pagel et al., Management Model, supra note 192, at 7; see also Shonee D. Langford, Full
Steam Ahead for the Umatilla Basin Aquifer Restoration Project, W. WATER L. & POL'Y REP. 67,
70 (2010).
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under the grant, limiting the possible benefits without reducing costs.2 06 The
study showed that the hoped-for groundwater baseflow discharges to the
Umatilla River (a central environmental benefit) were small and most
discharges would likely end up in the Columbia River.201 With these
restrictions and conditions, the project was scrapped in 2013.208
While the project proved to be unsuccessful, it represents an example of a
voluntary effort to address local groundwater depletions using novel legal tools
and grassroots efforts. Pushed to find a solution, the local governments and
interests were able to make significant progress towards restoring and
expanding their aquifer's potential.
D. The SGMA and the OCWD in California
Unlike the previous case studies, the California SGMA case study begins
as a state mandate to form local organizations with similar characteristics to
those mentioned above. At first glance, these Groundwater Sustainability
Agencies (GSAs) appear to be entirely involuntary and outside the scope of the
topic of voluntary groundwater organizations. However, the newly created
GSAs are inspired by voluntary groundwater organizations in California's
history, and the locally controlled GSAs will have significant control over the
means of achieving sustainability (including a somewhat locally defined
interpretation of sustainability itself). Additionally, the new GSAs will have
many components of an otherwise voluntary organization described in the
previous two examples. The GSAs will be selected by the local governments
and will have considerable independence in project development, and they
could potentially allow for a considerably locally-controlled groundwater
management system. The GSAs are the least voluntary case study of the three
discussed in this part of the article, since California's legislature mandated
their existence,209 and their plans must meet the sustainability standards
outlined in the SGMA. The voluntary components of the SGMA are the ability
of the GSAs to define how sustainability will be achieved at a local level, much
like the above examples in which they were able to determine the means of
managing groundwater locally.
The origin of the SGMA was the historic drought in 2012-2014,
dramatically limiting water availability in the state. As evidenced by tree-rings,
the drought was the worst to hit California in 1200 years.210 Combined with
extreme heat, the drought's effects showed the California legislature that
unprecedented changes needed to be made to water management in the state.





209 A.B. 2712, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
210 Daniel Griffin & Kevin J. Anchukaitis, How unusual is the 2012 2014 California drought?,
41 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 9017, 9021 (2014).
Vol. XXIX: I
2019 PECK ETAL.: GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT 31
tables.2 1' In some cases, the ground levels subsided one inch per month.
2 12
Before the SGMA, groundwater regulation was relatively limited, allowing
users to withdraw as much water as needed leaving a 'fair and just
proportion." to other groundwater users.2 13 No permit was required to
withdraw groundwater.214 The only recourse for groundwater users would be a
slow and expensive adjudication.2 5 Attempts to regulate groundwater have
been voluntary and rarely used, with only few exceptions.
One notable exception is the experience with groundwater depletions in
the early 1900s to the 1930s in Orange County. As early as 1925, water
engineers recommended that groundwater conservation measures be
implemented after water tables had dropped 2.5 feet per year.216 A local banker
and legislator introduced Senate Bill 1201, which allowed for the creation of
the OCWD with the goal of restoring groundwater levels and protecting water
rights in the basin.2' 7 However, OCWD was unable to prevent further
depletions.218 Faced with further losses of groundwater, the local groups
sought additional powers from the state legislature.
219
In the 1950s, the OCWD wished to impose a pumping fee based on the
quantity of water withdrawn from the aquifer and use the funds to locate
surface water to offset the use within the district.220 In 1953, the state
legislature granted their request in Senate Bill 91, which allowed OCWD to
impose the pump tax, measure withdrawals, estimate the sustainable yield of
the basin, and create tools to enforce compliance.221 In 1955, the state
legislature allowed "Water Replenishment Districts" to be formed voluntarily
in any part of the state with similar powers to the OCWD.222 However, only
one district, the Water Replenishment District of Southern California, took the
path paved by the OCWD to form a groundwater district voluntarily.
223
The GSAs to be formed by the SGMA will reproduce numerous aspects
of the voluntary organizations in California's previous groundwater laws, but
the SGMA requires their implementation across the state.224 The GSAs are to
be selected or formed by local government planning authorities, allowing cities
and counties to nominate existing local agencies or districts to be the region's
211 Tina C. Leahy, Desperate Times Call for Sensible Measures: The Making of The California
Sustainable Groundwater ManagementAct, 9 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 5, 18 (2015).
212 See Michael Kiparsky, Unanswered Questions for Implementation of the Sustainable
Groundwater Management Act, 70 CAL. AGRIC. 165, 165 (2016).
213 Leahy, supra note 211, at 6 (quoting Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766, 772 (Cal. 1903)).
214 Id. at9.
215 Id. at 13.
2161d. at 11.
217 Id. at 12.
218 A.B. 2712, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
219 Leahy, supra note 211, at 12.
220 Id. at 13.
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GSA.225 GSAs are given broad powers to manage groundwater and operate
water projects. GSAs have the authority to lease, purchase, and contract within
their jurisdiction.226 Programs for voluntary fallowing of agricultural land,
replacing groundwater with surface appropriations, and forming water
exchange agreements are among the tools in the GSA's toolbox.
227
The GSAs are also responsible for creating the Groundwater
Sustainability Plans (GSPs) that would achieve sustainable groundwater use by
2040.228 The plans include geological information, monitoring plans, a
description of other planning documents that relate to water use, and a way to
eliminate "undesirable results" within that timeframe.229 Undesirable results
are statutorily outlined, and include chronic decreases in groundwater levels,
significant and unreasonable loss of groundwater storage, saltwater intrusion,
subsidence, and surface stream interference.230 Each GSP will be required to
describe minimum thresholds for "significant and unreasonable effects"
developed by the GSA.231 The GSP is also required to set numerical objectives
ied to the minimum thresholds, with five-year interim milestones.
232
The GSA submits the GSP to the California Department of Water
Resources (CDWR).233 The CDWR reviews the GSP's terms against the
statutory mandates.234 The CDWR may determine that the GSP is approved,
incomplete, or inadequate.235 For example, the GSPs must be "reasonable and
supported by the best available information and best available science. "236 The
GSPs must show that any projects or management actions are "feasible and
likely to prevent undesirable results.1237 The central question of the CDWR's
review is whether the GSP and the goals designated by the GSA will
reasonably eliminate any "significant and unreasonable" undesirable ffects
caused by groundwater consumption.238 Despite the new planning and
management system, the SGMA allegedly makes no changes to pumpers'
water rights.
239
With the vast number of standards, reviews, and mandates, the GSAs (and
their GSPs) formed by the SGMA will have considerable voluntary aspects.
For example, the thresholds for "significant and unreasonable" effects are
225 CAL. WATER CODE § 10723 (West 2017); see also Leahy, supra note 211, at 36.
226 CAL. WATER CODE § 10726.2(a) (West 2014).
227 CAL. WATER CODE § 10726.2(b) (d) (West 2014).
228 CAL. WATER CODE § 10727.2(b)(1) (West 2014).
229 See CAL. CODE REGS. fit. 23, § 354.24 (2016).
230 CAL. WATER CODE § 1072 1(x)(1) (6) (West 2018).
231 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 354.28 (2019); see also CAL. CODE REGS. fit. 23, § 354.26
(2019).
232 CAL. CODE REGS. fit. 23, § 354.30(c) (2019).
233 CAL. WATER CODE § 10733.4(a) (West 2016).
234 CAL. WATER CODE § 1073 3(a) (West 2014).
235 CAL. CODE REGS. fit. 23, § 355.2(e) (2019).
236 CAL. CODE REGS. fit. 23, § 355.4(b)(1) (2019).
237 CAL. CODE REGS. fit. 23, § 355.4(b)(5) (2019).
238 CAL. CODE REGS. fit. 23, §§ 354.26(a), 354.24, 355.4(b)(1) (10) (2019).
239 CAL. WATER CODE § 10720.5(a) (c) (West 2016).
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initially set out by the GSA.240 The review of the CDWR requires only that the
GSPs be reasonable and supported by scientific evidence.24' These standards
give wide latitude to determine the means of achieving their own goals and
thresholds. While the SGMA is not a "bottom-up" example of voluntary
groundwater management, implementation of the GSP will likely require
support and voluntary efforts by agencies, cities, and individuals. The rights of
individual water users have not been altered by the SGMA, meaning that the
success of the SGMA will likely depend on decisions by pumpers to support
the goals of the GSP. The history of the policy development of the SGMA was
based on historic, purely-voluntary groundwater organizations in Orange
County, but the SGMA has numerous mandates and state reviews. While local
organizations will develop the GSPs, the fundamental sustainability goal of the
GSP is not locally determined-the GSP is subjected to state review and
revision.242 On the other hand, the GSA has considerable authority to define
the actual methods of achieving the state's goal. These aspects make it the least
voluntary of the case studies included in this review, while still representing a
limited form of a voluntary organization.
E. Summary
As seen in the above three examples, voluntary groundwater governance
organizations may become a more common approach to solving the tragedy of
the groundwater commons issue in the West. These examples show that
groundwater organizations form despite the rules and agency pressures, and yet
pressure from regulators can be the catalyst. Whether it is threatened future
reductions, a mandated reduction, or forced planning, collective groundwater
governance organizations are an emerging policy solution as well as
community solution to the tragedy of the commons.
IV. THE MOVEMENT TO VOLUNTEER PROGRAMS IN KANSAS
A. Introduction
For many people across the country, any mention of Kansas triggers
images of tornadoes and Oz. In his 2004 book, What's the Matter with
Kansas? Thomas Frank described Kansas as a place where people inexplicably
act against their own self-interests.243 In contrast to Frank's book, which
explored sociopolitical developments in Kansas, this portion of the article
241 CAL. WATER CODE § 1072 1(x)(l) (6) (West 2015).
241 See CAL. CODE REGS. fit. 23, § 355.4(b)(1) (10) (2019).
242 CAL. WATER CODE § 10733.4(d) (West 2016).
243 THOMAS FRANK, WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS?: How CONSERVATIVES WON THE
HEART OF AMERICA 239 (2004) ("The title is derived from a Pulitzer Prize winning editorial by
William Allen White published on August 16, 1896 in the Emporia (Kansas) Gazette newspaper
in which he took Populist leaders to task for letting Kansas slip into economic stagnation and not
keeping up economically with neighboring states because of Populist policies chasing away
economic capital from the state.").
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describes a group of Kansans taking action to protect their interests,
specifically, the use of water, both for themselves and for future generations.
The collaborative endeavor of these individuals and a number of governmental
entities has resulted in new laws and management mechanisms called local
enhanced management areas (LEMAs)244 and water conservation areas
(WCAs).245 With the creation of these special areas, the local water users have
set a precedent for extending the life of the aquifer on which their livelihoods
and lives depend. In some respects, this movement in Kansas is similar to those
described in the three case studies above.
B. Background on Kansas Hydrology and Water Law
Water availability and hydrology in Kansas differ greatly from the eastern
to the western boundaries. The eastern third of Kansas receives on average as
much as forty-five inches of rain each year, and most of its water is surface
water, in rivers, streams, and runoff.246 As one travels west across the state, the
average rainfall drops to as low as fifteen inches per year in the far western
swath,247 where there is very little surface water; groundwater is the primary
source of water in the western third of Kansas.
248
When members of the Kansas Legislature passed the Kansas Water
Appropriation Act (the Act) in 1945, they designed a regulatory system that
would address both surface water and groundwater.249 The Act, while
recognizing vested rights for uses that existed when the law was enacted,
established a permit system for acquiring a water right from that point on.
25
1
To determine which water right has the better priority in times of shortage,
"first in time, first in right" determines the priority for which water rights have
the better claim to use water.251 The Act dedicated the use of the waters of the
state to the people of the state, subject to control and regulation by the state.252
Accordingly, under the Act, a water right does not bestow absolute ownership
of the water,253 but the right to use water (the details of which are spelled out in
each permit).254 The Act granted the Chief Engineer of the Division of Water
Resources of the Kansas Department of Agriculture (DWR) broad discretion to
244 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1041 (West 2015).
245 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-745 (West 2017).
246 DOUGLAS G. GOODWIN ET AL., CLIMATE AND WEATHER ATLAS OF KANSAS 4 (1995),
https://www.k-state.edu/ksclimate/documents/kgsed.pdf [https://penna.cc/Y4AP-GXC5].
247 Id.
248 M. A. Sophocleus & B. B. Wilson, Surface Water in Kansas and its Interactions with
Groundwater, KAN. GEOLOGICAL SURV. (Nov. 21, 2000), http://www.kgs.ku.edu/HighPlains/
atlas/atswqn.htm [https://penia.cc/4R78-5ATM].
249 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-701 (West 2009).
250 KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-701, -703, -704a, -705 (West 2009).
251 Hawley v. Kan. Dep't of Agric., 132 P.3d 870, 879 (Kan. 2006) (citing J. Peck & Constance
C. Owen, Loss ofKansas Water Rightsfor Non-Use, 43 KAN. L. REv. 801 (1995)).
252 Hawley, 132 P.3d at 880; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-702 (West 1945).
253 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-707(a) (West 2009).
254 Id.; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-701(g) (West 2009).
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administer the Act in managing and regulating the use of water.255 In 1957, the
legislature amended the Act to state expressly that "a water right is a real
property right, appurtenant o and severable from the land on or in connection
with which the water is used. ,
256
The Act mandated that permits to appropriate water be granted if they
neither impaired an existing water right nor prejudicially and unreasonably
affected the public interest.257 In a perfect world, these two overarching
principles would seemingly have secured a sustainable water supply into
perpetuity. However, with the onset of technology that allowed for large-scale,
center-pivot irrigation systems, the demand for permits to use groundwater in
western Kansas skyrocketed. Using the scientific knowledge and data
resources available at the time, DWR approved record numbers of applications
for groundwater use in the West, mostly for irrigation.258 By the early 1970s,
with improved hydrologic technology and data collection and analysis, it
became clear and more widely known that groundwater sources were being
depleted faster than they could recharge.259 DWR faced a dilemma. If the use
of groundwater continued as authorized, water availability in those areas would
inevitably end. But, the Act declared water rights to be real property rights,260
which could be voluntarily conveyed by deed or will or involuntarily lost
261
through non-use or condemnation. The Act, however, did not authorize DWR
to initiate termination or reduction proceedings against existing water rights for
preservation of water for the future or for the reason that an area was now
known to be over-appropriated.
Virtually all the south-central and western parts of Kansas rely on
groundwater primarily supplied by the massive High Plains aquifer that
extends from Texas to the South Dakota border.262 Western Kansas relies
mostly on the part of the High Plains aquifer known as the Ogallala aquifer.
Groundwater reserves began to decrease in the 1950s and 1960s, and according
to the Kansas Geological Survey, the availability of groundwater in the
western Kansas Ogallala aquifer has today decreased since pre-development by
at least thirty percent and, in significantly large areas within that region, by
255 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-706 (West 2004).
256 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-701(g) (West 2009).
257 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-71 1(a) (West 1999).
258 Peck, Groundwater Management in Kansas, supra note 14, at 442 ("From only 334 permit
applications from 1945 to 1950, the number grew to 5,730 applications applied for in the decade
of the 1950s, and to 6,433 applications in the 1960s.").
259 OFFICE OF THE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR OF KAN., INTERIM REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S
TASK FORCE ON WATER RESOURCES 45 (1977).
260 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-701(g) (West 2009).
261 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-718(a) (West 2012) (determining a water right is lost for non-use over
5 years); see also Hawley v. Kan. Dep't of Agric., 132 P.3d 870, 885 (Kan. 2006) (holding intent
is not a consideration in determining whether DWR may terminate the right for non-use); John
Peck & Constance C. Owen, Loss of Water Rights for Non-Use, 43 KAN. L. REV. 801, 820 28
(1995).
262 REX C. BUCHANAN ET AL., THE HIGH PLAINS AQUIFER 1 (2015), http://www.kgs.ku.edul
Publications/pic18/PIC18R2.pdf [https://perna.cc/HU9Y-M63P].
KAN. JL. & PUB. POL 'Y
over sixty percent.
263
To address the depletion of the Ogallala aquifer, the Kansas Legislature
and DWR have employed a number of strategies. In 1972, the legislature
passed the Groundwater Management District Act, which enables the creation
of GMDs, run by locally-elected boards, to help manage and conserve the
aquifer in their respective areas, generally subject to approval of the Chief
Engineer.264 Five GMDs were created in the 1970s. In 1978, the legislature
added provisions allowing for the designation of intensive groundwater use
control areas (IGUCAs) within GMDs.265 Under these provisions, the Chief
Engineer, either on his or her own initiative,266 or by request from a GMD
board (or by petition from water users in the GMD), is empowered to impose
corrective control provisions in areas found to be suffering excessive
groundwater level decline.267 The process of ordering the establishment of an
IGUCA by the Chief Engineer requires public hearings, but the ultimate terms
are for the Chief Engineer to determine.268 To date, the Chief Engineer has
designated eight IGUCAs; although each is tailored to its own locale, all
involve some measure of restriction on the exercise of existing water rights.
269
The most important and significant IGUCA created was for the Cheyenne
Bottoms Wildlife Area in 1992-the Walnut Creek IGUCA.270 Upstream wells
in the Walnut Creek alluvium were diminishing streamflows in Walnut Creek.
The Chief Engineer's order generally protected vested rights in the basin.
271
But the order did not follow strict prior appropriation rules when it forced
major pumping reductions on hundreds of groundwater users with
appropriation rights, mostly irrigators, to protect the state's water right
obtained in 1951 to supplement the water in the Cheyenne Bottoms Wildlife
Area near Great Bend, Kansas.272 Instead the order did a kind of mass pumping
reduction by creating two large classes of water appropriation rights (with
priority dates prior to and after October 1, 1965) and ordering much greater
263 Kansas High Plains Aquifer Within Kansas, KAN. GEOLOGICAL SURV., http://www.kgs.ku.edu
/HighPlains/HPA Atlas/Aquifer% 20Basics/index.html [https://penna.cc/R4JN-VP6B].
264 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1020 (West 1972).
265 KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-1036 38 (West 2019).
266 Kan. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 2002-24 (May 9, 2002).
267 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1036 (West 1972).
268 KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-1036 38 (West 2019).
269 Intensive Groundwater Use ControlAreas (IGUCA), KAN. DEP'T OF AGRIC., https://
agriculture .ks.gov/divisions-programs/dwr/managing-kansas-water-resources/intensive-ground
water-use-control-areas [https://perma.cc/NDP9-YWWK].
270 See John C. Peck, Property Rights in Groundwater Some Lessons from the Kansas
Experience, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 493, 499 500, 504-05 (2003); Walnut Creek IGUCA,
KAN. DEP'T OF AGRIC., https://agriculture.ks.gov/divisions-prograns/dwr/managing-kansas-
water-re source s/intensive-groundwater-use -control-areas/walnut-creek-iguca [https://perma.cc/N
TY6-HRME].
271 See generally DIv. OF WATER RES., KAN. STATE BD. OF AGRIC., IN THE MATTER OF THE
DESIGNATION OF AN INTENSIVE GROUNDWATER USE CONTROL AREA IN BARTON, RUSH AND
NESS COUNTIES, KANSAS (1992).
272 Id.
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pump reductions on rights created after the 1965 date.2"3 However, each of
these water right holders in the more junior group were cut in the same
percentage, not according to strict priority. The affected irrigators filed an
appeal in district court, in which they claimed an unconstitutional taking of
property without compensation, but they settled the case before a district court
heard the case.
274
No water user wants water use to be cut involuntarily, and not
surprisingly, water users following the 1992 IGUCA have not welcomed the
designation of IGUCAs and the corresponding reduction in their use of water,
reductions over which they have no control. Indeed, the fear of an IGUCA
being imposed on them is what spurred local water users in several areas of
Kansas to seek alternative approaches to reducing aquifer withdrawals.275 One
was the Rattlesnake Creek Basin/Quivira Partnership Agreement in 1994.2
76
More recently has been the creation of LEMAs and WCAs.
C. Local Leadership, Cooperation, and Trust: LEMAs
277
1. Initial Stages of Development
The problem of declining aquifer levels and recharging in certain areas of
northwest Kansas became acute enough by 2008 for DWR and the Northwest
Kansas Groundwater Management District No. 4 (GMD4) to explore options
for action.271 The most effective legal tool available to DWR was the IGUCA
option, but staffs from both DWR and the GMD hoped to find a way to create
consensus among the local water users, rather than the top-down imposition of
restrictions under an IGUCA.
279
DWR, led by Chief Engineer David Barfield, was interested in creating a
flexible multi-year allocation scheme as part of a solution.280 Every water right
contains a limitation on the maximum amount of water that can be lawfully
diverted each calendar year.281 Some flexibility was already possible under
legislation enacted in 2001, permitting "multi-year flex accounts.' 2 2 This
273 Id.
274 Peck, Groundwater Management in Kansas, supra note 14, at 452 53.
275 Interviews by Constance Owen with staff members of DWR and GMD4.
276 Peck, Groundwater Management in Kansas, supra note 14, at 452 53.
277 The authors appreciate and acknowledge the generous contributions of information from
Wayne Bossert, former District Manager of Northwest Kansas GMD4 (retired); Ray Luhnian,
former District Manager of Northwest Kansas GMD4 (retired); Scott Ross, former Water
Commissioner of the DWR Stockton Field Office (retired); Burke Griggs, Professor, Washburn
(Topeka) Law School and former Senior Legal Counsel for DWR; Shannon Kenyon, District
Manager of Northwest Kansas GMD4 and former Environmental Technician for the DWR
Stockton Field Office. These people have reviewed this section and suggested valuable comments
and changes.
278 Interviews by Constance Owen with staff members of DWR and GMD4.
279 Id.
280 Id.
281 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-701(d), (f) (West 2009).
282 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-736 (West 2018).
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statute, for example, simply stated that a water right holder could be allowed to
carry-over a portion of the authorized quantity that went unused in one year to
the following year, but would be limited to a maximum amount over a five-
year period.213 This kind of plan could encourage efficient use, especially if
tied to conservation measures and the water right is protected from the risk of
being declared abandoned for non-use.284 However, prior to 2001, DWR could
not require or allow water users to employ a flexible scheme, or any other
corrective controls, without doing so under the aegis of an IGUCA.
Meanwhile, GMD4 Executive Director Wayne Bossert sought ways to
bring his local water users into the process, to get them engaged in solving
their water availability problems. Bossert and his staff, including longtime
expert Ray Luhman, knew the public needed to be motivated to take action.285
Water users would need compelling reasons to reduce their own water use on a
more voluntary basis. Simultaneous developments provided those reasons. One
involved a request that had been submitted to DWR seeking administration of
water.28 6 Under the Act, when a senior water right is not receiving its full
quantity of water due to use by a junior water right, the senior may file a
complaint with DWR.287 DWR will then investigate, and, if the junior right is
found to be impairing the senior right, DWR can lawfully curtail the junior's
use.288 The pending request involved water right holders in GMD4 where the
water supply had been over-appropriated (more permits had been granted than
the system could sustain).28 9 If the matter had proceeded to completion, a
significant number of water rights would have to have been shut off The
juniors were spared this draconian result, however, because the complaint was
withdrawn.290 Nevertheless, this incident made two things strikingly clear to
local water users: the fact of over-appropriation and the considerable
independent power of DWR.
Bossert and his staff provided the other development that motivated water
users to get involved: they initiated focused studies to gather geographically
specific and accurate data regarding water use and availability in targeted areas
of GMD4 to share with their board of directors and the public. GMD4 is
governed by a board of directors, elected by water users within the district
boundaries. GMD4 identified "High Priority Areas," (HPAs) where increasing
aquifer depletion and decreasing aquifer recharge were of greatest concern and
gathered large amounts of data about them.291 One HPA was labeled Sheridan
283 2001 Kan. Sess. Laws Ch. 160 (previously referred to as S.B. 237).
284 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-718 (West 2019) (describing a similar scheme seen in KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 82a-736's authority for establishing "multi-year flex accounts").
285 Interviews by Constance Owen with staff members of DWR and GMD4.
286 Id.
287 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-706a (West 1977); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 5-4-1 (2010).
288 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-706a (West 1977); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 5-4-1 (2010).
289 Interviews by Constance Owen with staff members of DWR and GMD4.
290 Id.
291 Enhanced Mgmt., GROUNDWATER MGMT. DIST. 4, http://www.gmd4.org/EnhanceMgt.html
[https://perma.cc/MV1WW4-D7XB].
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6, for Sheridan County in which most of it was located, with a portion in
Thomas County as well.292 The data, compiled from GMD4, the Kansas
Geological Survey, and the Kansas Water Office, was shared with the board
and local water users in public GMD4 board meetings.
293
The fact that this study was taking place and that GMD4 was taking it
seriously sent a clear message to the local water users-they had a problem
severe enough for the state to get involved. They faced the real threat of an
IGUCA being declared in their area and their water rights being cut back,
perhaps significantly. Bossert encouraged them to avoid this possibility by
getting engaged and crafting a local solution.294 The summary that the GMD4
provided at the public information meeting held on November 10, 2008,
reflects this dynamic.295 A member of the public asked, "What happens if the
State independently addresses the problem?" The response: "No way to predict
when or how the State might address the problem in the absence of local
efforts. "296
Local water right holders got the message. The GMD4 website contains
the minutes from a series of thirteen public meetings that took place over the
next three and a half years to seek a solution to the depletion problem.29' The
GMD4 provided data to the group of local users and urged them to propose
reductions they themselves would implement.29 GMD4 ran the locals'
proposals through computer models, particularly models developed for use in
litigation between Kansas and Nebraska over the Republican River Compact,
to inform the locals of what impact their proposals would have on saturated
thickness levels and recharge rates.299 In April 2011, after a series of back-and-
forth trials over two and half years, the locals and the GMD4 identified a
proposal on which they agreed.3 0 0 Important to this endeavor was the amount
of ime, effort, and patience invested by the GMD4 staff to communicate
clearly to, and collaborate with, the local water users. The key to this endeavor
was the creation of a partnership of trust.
The achievement of a cooperative locally-driven proposal
notwithstanding, a number of significant obstacles remained. The most
daunting was the lack of a mechanism for making the proposal legally binding.
The local users did not want the Chief Engineer to declare an IGUCA, even if
they received assurances from the Chief Engineer that their proposal would be
292 Meeting of Sheridan HPA SD-6, GROUNDWATER MGMT. DIST. 4 (Nov. 10, 2008),
http://www.gmd4.org/SD6/SD6-Comments-01.pdf [https://penna.cc/4VBP-5GHP].
293 Sheridan County (SD-6), GROUNDWATER MGMT. DIST. 4 [hereinafter GROUNDWATER MGMT.




296 Id. (emphasis added).
297 GROUNDWATER MGMT. DIST. 4, Sheridan County (SD-6), supra note 293.
298 d; Interviews by Constance Owen with staff members of DWR and GMD4.
299 Interviews by Constance Owen with staff members of DWR and GMD4.
100 GROUNDWATER MGMT. DIST. 4, Sheridan County (SD-6), supra note 293.
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implemented.30' IGUCA procedures call for public hearings, at which evidence
and comments may be presented. It was possible that evidence might show up
persuading the Chief Engineer to modify or disregard the local users'
proposal.30 2 They wanted a guarantee that their proposal would either be
accepted or rejected, as is, without modification.303 This guarantee was not
possible under the IGUCA statute. This kind of guarantee required a brand new
law.
At the June 1, 2011 GMD4 board meeting, the board of directors
instructed staff to begin working on new legislative authority for implementing
the new proposal.30 4 This effort would require another level of cooperation. It
would take a united front of affected agencies and entities to convince the
legislature to pass a new law, especially one that would need to pass without
significant amendment. For example, if the legislature removed the "accept or
reject as is" component, the law would be of no use in advancing this proposal.
DWR legal counsel and staff, with assistance from GMD4 legal counsel and
staff, drafted the statutory language for the bill to be introduced; both entities
agreed on its content.305 Before the start of the January 2012 legislative
session, legislators were contacted and informed about the situation and the
bill.306
Securing the legislature's cooperation would not be enough; the
governor's office would also need to be brought on board. On July 21, 2011,
the GMD4 board requested support for the proposed legislation from the
governor's recently created Ogallala Aquifer Advisory Committee (OAAC).
30
1
Bossert presented the locally-created management concept at the OAAC's first
meeting in August 2011; the OAAC agreed to support it. 308 At that meeting, a
name emerged for the new concept, "Local Enhanced Management Area," or
LEMA, for short.
309
On January 19, 2012, the new LEMA bill, Senate Bill 310, was
introduced in the legislature. The Kansas Legislature passed it without
significant change, and the governor signed it into law on April 12, 2012.310
The bill became law: section 82a-1041 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated. The
key provisions of the law state that such a proposal must be locally-driven and
within the boundaries of a GMD; the Chief Engineer may approve or reject it,
but may not unilaterally modify it; and the Chief Engineer (DWR) is
responsible for enforcing the terms of the proposal.31 ' "In short, K.S.A. 82a-
301 Interviews by Constance Owen with staff members of DWR and GMD4.
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 GROUNDWATER MGMT. DIST. 4, Sheridan County (SD-6), supra note 293.
305 Interviews by Constance Owen with staff members of DWR and GMD4.
306 Id.
301 GROUNDWATER MGMT. DIST. 4, Sheridan County (SD-6), supra note 293.
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 S.B. 310, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2012).
311 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1041 (West 2015).
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1041 combines local control over the particular details of a management plan
to reduce groundwater use with the powers of the Chief Engineer to approve
and enforce that plan." '312
2. The New LEMA Law
The new LEMA statute, section 82a-1041 of the Kansas Statute
Annotated, is largely procedural, but establishment of a LEMA has substantive
effects. Other than requiring findings that corrective controls over groundwater
use are needed, the LEMA law generally provides flexibility to address
different specifics of any given proposal on a case-by-case basis.
Fundamentally, the LEMA law applies only to water rights within a GMD, and
a GMD board of directors must recommend a LEMA to initiate the process.313
Some members of either an IGUCA or a LEMA may not wish to be subject to
forced reduced pumping, but the LEMA statute, like the IGUCA, appears to
allow a LEMA to be established over these objections and protests.
The LEMA law sets up a three-stage fact-finding and/or review process.
When a GMD recommends a LEMA to the Chief Engineer, the Chief Engineer
is required to review it to make sure it covers mandated topics, such as clear
boundaries and an enforcement mechanism.14 If the proposal contains the
necessary provisions, the Chief Engineer conducts an initial public hearing to
"resolve the following findings of fact": (1) whether one or more of the
hydrologic circumstances necessitating an IGUCA exist; (2) whether the public
interest requires adoption of any corrective control provisions; and (3) whether
the proposed geographic boundaries are reasonable.315 If all three issues of fact
are found to exist, then the Chief Engineer holds a second public hearing at
which evidence is taken, a record made, and the only subject matter is the
LEMA, as originally proposed.316 The Chief Engineer has only three options in
response to the second hearing: approve the proposal, reject the proposal, or
return the proposal to the GMD with an opportunity for revision within ninety
days.31 7 The law also indicates the kind of corrective control provisions the
Chief Engineer may approve (in accordance with the proposal). It further
allows the Chief Engineer to delegate enforcement authority to the specific
GMD, upon written request by the GMD.318 Finally, the LEMA law addresses
effective dates, appeal procedures, and review timelines.
319
312 KAN. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ORDER APPROVING THE SHERIDAN 6 LOCAL ENHANCED
MANAGEMENT AREA WITHIN GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT No. 4 3 (2013)
[hereinafter KAN. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ORDER APPROVING THE SHERIDAN 6], https://sftp.kda.ks.gov
:4443/LEMAs/SD6/LEMA.SD6.OrderOtDesignation.20130417.pdf [https://penna.cc/MWT4T3L
K].
313 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1041(a) (West 2015).
314 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1041(a)(1) (6) (West 2015).
315 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1041(b)(1) (3) (West 2015).
316 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1041(b) (c) (West 2015).
317 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1041(d)(1) (3) (West 2015).
318 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1041(f) (West 2015).
319 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1041 (West 2015).
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3. The Sheridan 6 LEMA
With the new law in place, GMD4 quickly began the process of
submitting its proposal. On July 16, 2012, GMD4 submitted the final version
of the proposed Sheridan 6 LEMA to the Chief Engineer.3 20 The Chief
Engineer began the statutory steps for evaluating the proposal, including a two-
stage public hearing process, with hearings held in Hoxie, Kansas, on
September 13, 2012 and November 28, 2012.321 Upon completion of the
hearings, the Chief Engineer issued the initial Order of Decision on December
31, 2012 and the final Order of Designation on April 17, 2013.322 The new
Sheridan 6 LEMA is small in size relative to the entire GMD4; it encompasses
101 sections lying in parts of six townships out of 155 townships in the entire
GMD4 and involves 183 water rights covering 198 wells.3 23 No appeals of the
order were filed.
As the Chief Engineer summarized in his final Order of Designation
Approving the Sheridan 6 LEMA,
[g]roundwater levels in the area (of the proposed LEMA) are declining, in
some cases precipitously; these levels have declined excessively; and the
rate of withdrawal of groundwater there exceeds the rate of recharge.
GMD4 and the stakeholders within the SD-6 HPA recognize that these
declines are a long-term problem that requires a long-term solution. 324
The key features of this sixty-page detailed LEMA order were as follows.
Groundwater withdrawals would be reduced by twenty percent over the five-
year period from January 1, 2013 to December 31, 2017;325 irrigators would be
restricted to a total of fifty-five inches of water over the stated five-year period
(an average of eleven inches per year); and flexibility allowed for carry-over
from year to year as long as the five-year diversion total did not exceed fifty-
five inches.3 26 Prior to the LEMA, the standard for annual diversions in this
area had been eighteen inches per year,3 21 meaning the reduction in use would
be nearly thirty-nine percent. In support of the five-year fifty-five-inch
allocation, the Chief Engineer stated,
[t]he Proposal sets all irrigation water rights at a 55 inch allocation
for five years, and several experienced irrigators within the Sheridan
6 LEMA gave oral testimony stating that this would be sufficient
water for their needs, obviating the need for priority administration..
• . No one testified that 11 inches would be insufficient for their
320 See GROUNDWATER MGMT. DIST. 4, Sheridan County (SD-6), supra note 293.
321 Id.
322 KAN. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ORDER APPROVING THE SHERIDAN 6, supra note 312, at 1.
323 Id. at 47.
324 Id. at 24.
325
1 d. at 25.
326 Id.
327 KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 5-3-24 (2000).
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irrigation needs. Furthermore, the Proposal allows irrigators to move
water around within their allocations, and to obtain water rights from
others within the LEMA boundaries . . . And in the event that a
senior water right is impaired as a result of direct well interference
by a junior right, the GMD4 testimony makes clear that such a senior
right will be entitled to request an impairment investigation by
DVR.
328
In addition, those guilty of violating the restrictions would face
significantly higher penalties under the LEMA than they would under the Act.
Under the Sheridan 6 LEMA, the penalty for diverting water in excess of one's
allocation ranges from $1,000 per day of violation (exceeding one's allocation
by less than four acre-feet) to a two-year suspension of the entire water right
(exceeding one's allocation by more than four acre-feet).3 29 Other penalties are
described in the order.
330
The Sheridan 6 LEMA limited its duration to a five-year period (2013 to
2017) with no provision for renewal.33 1 The Order of Designation comments
on the apparent ineffectiveness of a short-term approach to a long-term
problem,
K.S.A. 82a-1041(d) does not require a local enhanced management plan
to establish a permanent reduction in groundwater use; it merely requires
the plan to address the problem of declines. Nonetheless, unless this
LEMA is renewed for a longer period, then the work and cooperation of
GMD4, [Kansas Geological Survey] and DWR will be largely wasted,
and remembered as little more than a gesture.
332
But, the Sheridan 6 LEMA was renewed in November 2017, to run an
additional five years through 2022,33 3 at which time renewal may be addressed
again.
a. Has the Sheridan 6 LEMA worked?
If pumped to the full extent of the water rights within the Sheridan 6
LEMA, 56,481 acre-feet annually could be diverted, or 282,405 acre-feet over
a five-year period. During the pre-LEMA period 2008-2012, annual pumping
averaged 27,800 acre-feet, for a total of 139,000 acre-feet over the period. The
goal of the Sheridan 6 LEMA was to reduce the total groundwater withdrawals
328 KAN. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ORDER APPROVING THE SHERIDAN 6, supra note 312, at 18 (citations
to record omitted).329 1Id. at37 38.
330 Id.
331 GROUNDWATER MGMT. DIST. 4, Sheridan County (SD-6), supra note 293.
332 KAN. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ORDER APPROVING THE SHERIDAN 6, supra note 312, at 24.
333 See generally KAN. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ORDER OF DESIGNATION REGARDING THE SHERIDAN 6
LOCAL ENHANCED MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR 2018-2022, https://agriculture.ks.gov/docs/default-
source/dwr-water-appropriation-documents/sheridan6_lema order of designation 20171107.pdf
?sfvrsn=393583cl_4 [https://perma.cc/NYR7-JAPA].
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in the designated area from 139,000 acre-feet to no more than 114,000 acre-
feet over the five-year period. This would equate to an average annual
reduction in water diversions from the 56,481 acre-feet represented on paper,
and from 27,800 acre-feet pumped annually, to no more than 22,800 acre-feet
annually. The usage records for the first five years of the LEMA (2013 through
2017) are available, revealing an average yearly use of 18,435 acre-feet,
compared to the LEMA goal of 22,800 acre-feet, to the average annual amount
of 27,800 acre-feet, and to the permitted amount of 56,481 acre-feet. Thus, the
reduction in groundwater use within the LEMA boundaries exceeded the goal:
less water was used than the target amounts.
334
Another encouraging aspect of this LEMA was its apparent economic
impact. According to a Kansas State University study, "producer-supplied data
suggests that producers within the LEMA boundary have been able to reduce
groundwater use with minimal impact on cash flow. '335 This study indicates
that producers are able to implement strategies to maintain returns and apply
less groundwater, but the report notes that "additional research on the risk
associated with reduced groundwater use is needed.
336
Not surprisingly, the local water users and GMD4 are actively working
with DWR to continue this successful strategy. In early 2017, at the request of
producers in the Sheridan 6 LEMA, GMD4 applied for renewal of the LEMA.
In November 2017, DWR approved renewal.33' The total use for the first year
of the new period was 16,909 acre-feet.
b. Reflections on the Sheridan 6 LEAA Story
When one considers the potential for distrust or disagreement on the part
of numerous governmental entities, various legislators, the governor, members
of the local GMD board, and the local water users themselves, one would have
predicted that a new law and this LEMA would have stood a slim chance of
ever happening. Thus, the most important aspect of the Sheridan 6 LEMA
story is cooperation. The explanation in this article describes what may appear
to be an almost linear succession of events, in which one step enabled the next
and so on.
One might describe the process as more akin to a three-ring circus in
which most performers continually leapt from ring to ring and back again. The
seemingly distinct steps often overlapped and blended, made unavoidable by
simultaneously addressing regulatory, legal, hydrological, legislative and
political concerns. This maelstrom of cooperation was made possible by
114 The data in this paragraph were obtained through interviews by Constance Owen with staff
members of DWR and GMD4.
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numerous hours of effort expended, and often shared, by GMD staff38 in
Colby, GMD legal counsel in Goodland, DWR staff and attorneys in Topeka,
staff in the DWR Stockton field office, Kansas Geological Survey staff in
Lawrence, and Kansas Water Office staff in Topeka, not to mention the
essential efforts of Bossert, Barfield, and the dedicated local water users who
volunteered their time to find a workable solution.
4. Subsequent LEMA Proposals
The Sheridan 6 LEMA success has apparently inspired additional efforts
toward more voluntary reductions of water use through the LEMA process,
with varying degrees of success so far. In 2014, Western Kansas Groundwater
Management District No. 1 (GMD1) explored the possibility of creating a
LEMA, but a lack of public support led the board of directors to drop the
idea.33 9 However, GMD1 revisited the LEMA idea in 2018, listing it on its
website as a topic for discussion at its board meeting in April and July. 340 As of
November 2019, the GMD1 website included a draft plan for a LEMA that
would go into effect in 202 L"
The board of Southwest Kansas Groundwater Management District No. 3
(GMD3) has also been exploring a possible LEMA, as noted in the minutes
from board meetings as recent as May 2018.342 No official proposal has yet
been submitted to the Chief Engineer.
In 2017, GMD4 proposed a more geographically ambitious LEMA than
the Sheridan 6, one that would cover the entirety of GMD4, which
encompasses ninety-five townships, and would be in effect from January 2018
through December 2022.341 This LEMA process also differed from Sheridan 6
338 Special recognition is due to the true leadership demonstrated by fonner GMD4 District
Manager Wayne Bossert. He relentlessly pursued a collaborative approach, while insisting on a
meaningful result supported by extensive data. He trusted his community and earned their trust in
return. The Chief Engineer lauded this approach in his final Order of Designation for the Sheridan
6 LEMA, "The process by which GMD4 has produced the Proposal, and the purpose with which
it has pursued this LEMA, deserve praise. As Mr. Bossert stated, '[i]n the end, the consensus was
that consensus was the preferred approach."' KAN. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FINDINGS AND ORDER
ESTABLISHING THE INITIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DESIGNATION OF A LOCAL ENHANCED
MANAGEMENT AREA 10 https://agriculture.ks.gov/docs/default-source/dwr-water-appropriation-
documents/sd6 lema orderexhibits_2 0 1 7 0 5 3 1.pdf [https://perma.cc/WNQ6-TGJN].
"I GROUNDWATER MGMT. DIST. 1, DRAFT OF WICHITA COUNTY LEMA PROPOSAL, http://
www.gmdl .org/documents/Draft-Wichita-County-Lema-Proposal.pdf [https://penna.cc/HGD9-2
57H].340 LEA<L Information, GROUNDWATER MGMT. DIST. 1, http://www.gmdl.org/lema.htnil [https://
penna.cc/LP8V-MMJZ].
341 Id.
342 GROUNDWATER MGMT. DIST. 3, MINUTES OF THE REGULAR MEETING OF THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS (2018), http://www.gmd3.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Minutes-5-18.pdf [https:
//penna.cc/B9TQ-EF8N].
343 GMD4 District Wide LEMA, KAN. DEP'T OF AGRIC., http://agriculture.ks.gov/divisions-
programs/dwr/managing-kansas-wate r-r  source s/local-enhanced-management-areas/gmd4-distric
t-wide-lema [https://penna.cc/DXB3-29WC] [hereinafter KAN. DEP'T OF AGRIC., GMD4 District
Wide LEKAL].
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in the level of public opposition. The initial hearing for the GMD4 District-
Wide LEMA took place in August 2017; an order of first-stage approval was
issued on September 23, 2017."'4 Shortly thereafter, intervenors entered the
matter and filed a number of challenges to the proceedings, which were
rejected.3 45 The second hearing was held on December 11, 2017.346 After
modifications by the GMD4 board, the LEMA Order of Designation was
ultimately issued on April 13, 201g.14' The intervenors requested
administrative review of the order, which the Secretary of Agriculture
denied.3 48 They then filed for judicial review in the District Court of Gove
County, Kansas, making essentially the same arguments as they had in the
other challenges. On October 15, 2019, the district court upheld the new
LEMA.3 49 On November 12, 2019, the intervenors filed a Motion to Alter or
Amend and to Amend and Make Additional Findings.3 50 In doing so, they
sought relief by requesting that the court set aside the order establishing the
LEMA.3 51 The memorandum in support of the motion stated that the
intervenors couldn't speak for other water users in the LEMA, and thus
requested that the LEMA Plan to be set aside only "as applied to their lands."
352 In short, they argued that the Chief Engineer and the court had failed to
apply the prior appropriation doctrine and to preserve Kansas water use
doctrine, as required by Kansas statutes.3 53 The matter remains pending at this
time.
One other LEMA proposal has been submitted to the Chief Engineer.
With a cover letter dated February 22, 2019, Big Bend Groundwater
Management District No. 5 (GMD5) requested a Quivira National Wildlife
344 Id.
145 KAN. DEP'T OF AGRIC., DECISION TO DENY INTERVENORS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
(2017), https://agriculture.ks.gov/docs/default-source/dwr-water-appropriation-
documents/gmd4lema-decision re motion for reconsideration signed.pdfsfvrsn=172583cl0
[https://penna.cc/BS6M-9XTX].
346 KAN. DEP'T OF AGRIC., GMD4 District Wide LEMAI, supra note 343.
147 KAN. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ORDER OF DESIGNATION REGARDING THE GROUNDWATER
MANAGEMENT DISTRICT NO. 4 DISTRICT-WIDE LOCAL ENHANCED MANAGEMENT PLAN (2018),
https://agriculture .ks.gov/docs/default-source/dwr-water-appropriation-documents/gmd4_lema
orderofde signation.pdfsfvrsn=30e981 c _4 [https://perma.cc/V48J-VMSH].




149 Friesen et al. v. Barfield, No. 2018-CV-000010 (Dist. Ct. of Gove Co. Kan. Oct. 15, 2019).
350 Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend and to Amend and Make Additional Findings, Friesen et
al. v. Barfield, No. 2018-CV-000010 (Dist. Ct. of Gove Co. Kan. Nov. 12, 2019). This
information will appear on the following website: https://agriculture.ks.gov/divisions-
programs/dwr/managing-kansas-wate r-r  source s/local-enhanced-management-areas/gmd4-
district-wide-lema.
351 Id.
352 Memorandum in Support of Plantiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend and to Amend and Make
Additional Findings, Friesen et al. v. Barfield, No. 2018-CV-000010 (Dist. Ct. of Gove Co. Kan.
Nov. 12, 2019).
353 Id. at 4-5, 19.
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Refuge/Rattlesnake Creek LEMA. 354 This proposal was in part due to a request
by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service for administration of its large surface
water right out of the Rattlesnake Creek to supply the Quivira National
Wildlife Refuge.355 The Chief Engineer reviewed the proposal, and related
modifications by the GMD5 in the spring of 2019. On July 30, 2019, the Chief
Engineer wrote to the GMD5, rejecting the proposal and stating that, absent an
acceptable LEMA proposal, he must carry out his statutory duty "to directly
administer" the basin by administrative order.3 56 On August 14, 2019, GMD5
filed a petition for review and for stay with the Secretary of Agriculture. 57 A
diverse coalition of interested entities followed with a letter dated August 27,
2019, asking the chief engineer to reconsider his rejection of the LEMA. 3 58 On
September 3, 2019, the Secretary of Agriculture denied the request for stay but
granted the petition for review.3 59 On October 25, 2019, the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service announced that it would not make a request for water during
FY 2020, but instead would work with local agencies to find "voluntary,
collaborative, non-regulatory solutions to address the water needs of the
community."3 60 The matter remains pending at the time of this writing.
114 Quivira NWR LE3!-I, BIG BEND GROUND WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT 5,
https://gmd5.org/proposed-rsc-lema [https://perna.cc/RH8R-B7U4]; GMD 5 Rattlesnake/Quivira
LEMI4, KAN. DEP'T OF AGRIC., http://agriculture.ks.gov/divisions-programs/dwr/managing-kansa
s-water-resource s/local-enhanced-management-areas/gnd5 -rattlesnake -quivira-lema [https://perm
a.cc/8KKN-KQKV].
355 Quivira National Wildlife Refuge Impairment Complaint, KAN. DEP'T OF AGRIC. [hereinafter
KAN. DEP'T OF AGRIC., Quivira National Wildlife Refuge Impairment Complaint],
https://agriculture.ks.gov/divisions-programs/dwr/water-appropriation/impairnentcomplaints/
quivira-national-wildlife-refuge [https://penna.cc/T4AB-HTSD].
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358 Letter from Matt Teagarden, CEO, Kansas Livestock Association, et al., to David Barfield-
Chief Engineer, Kansas Department of Agriculture (Aug. 27, 2019).
159 See generally KAN. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR STAY OF
PROCEEDINGS AND GRANTING PETITION FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW SUBMITThD BY BIG
BEND GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT NO.5 AND NOTICE OF PREHEARING
CONFERENCE (2019), https://agriculture.ks.gov/docs/default-source/dwr-water-appropriation-
documents/20190830_ 19-water-16274 ---order-denying-petition-for-stay-and-granting-petition-
for-review-and-notice-of-prehearing-conference.pdt? sfvrsn ed4a89c 1_0 [https://penna.cc/D55R-
JPW7]; Letter from David W. Barfield, Chief Eng'r, Div. of Water Res., to Darrell Wood,
President, Big Bend Groundwater Mgmt. Dist. No. 5 (July 30, 2019), https://agriculture.ks.gov/do
cs/default-source/dwr-water-appropriation-documents/2019-07-30fonnalresponsetofeb2o19lema_
request.pdfsfvrsn e5d688cl0 [https://perna.cc/MZ67-T3MS] (also requesting acknowledge-
ment from DWR that the Audubon Society qualifies as a party under the Kansas Judicial Review
Act and notification of all orders and decisions that are given to other parties to the proceeding).
360 KAN. DEP'T OF AGRIC., Quivira National Wildlife Refuge Impairment Complaint, supra note
355.
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D. Expanding on the LEMA Initiative: Water Conservation Areas (WCAs)
The LEMA law, first employed by the Sheridan 6 LEMA, paved the way
for another statutory scheme designed to slow depletion of the Ogallala aquifer
in Kansas. In April 2015, the Kansas Legislature passed a bill to create
WCAs.3 61 WCAs share some fundamental aspects with LEMAs. As with
LEMAs, the goal of WCAs is to reduce groundwater pumping.3 62 WCAs also
must be initiated by water users and contain certain types of provisions, such
as corrective controls and enforcement mechanisms. DWR is charged with
carrying out those enforcement actions.
3 63
But WCAs also differ from LEMAs in several important aspects.
Establishment involves a more streamlined adoption process. WCAs can be
created either within or outside of GMDs.3 64 If the terms of the WCA conflict
with pre-existing rules, such as those imposed by a GMD or IGUCA, the Chief
Engineer is authorized to modify the WCA to impose the stricter of the
measures.65 However, the most important distinction between the WCAs and
LEMAs is the requirement that all members of a WCA agree to the plan and
ensuing reductions in groundwater pumping. To initiate a WCA, water right
owners submit a written plan, referred to as a consent agreement, directly to
the Chief Engineer of DVR.3 66 The statute empowering water right owners to
establish WCAs contains no requirements for public hearings,367 apparently
because the plan reflects an agreement among water right holders. Ascribing
motives to the water users who enter into these WCA voluntary agreements is
difficult-they could range from fear of an IGUCA or a LEMA, the "writing is
on the wall" syndrome, the need to preserve water for future generations,
368
maintenance of jobs and business opportunities in the future,369 or pure
altruism. Yet, as contracts law teaches us, in contract formation, motive is not
to be confused with consent, and it is the outward expression of assent that
governs, not secret intentions.
370
To date, beginning in January 2016, fifty-three Water Conservation Area
(WCA) consent decrees have been approved by DWR.371 More than 86,000
361 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-745 (West 2017).
362 [d.
363 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-745(a) (West 2017); Water Conservation Areas (WCAs), KAN. DEP'T
OF AGRIC. [hereinafter KAN. DEP'T OF AGRIC., Water Conservation Areas (WCAs) ], http://agricul
ture.ks.gov/divisions-programs/dwr/managing-kansas-water-resources/wca [https://penna.cc/6RH
E-UWXS].
364 KAN. DEP'T OF AGRIC., Water Conservation Areas (WCAs), supra note 363.
365 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-745(d) (West 2017).
366 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-745(a) (West 2017).
367 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-745 (West 2017).
368 STEPHEN LAUER & MATTHEW R. SANDERSON, PRODUCER ATTITUDES TOWARD GROUND
WATER CONSERVATION IN THE U.S. OGALLALA-HIGH PLAINS 3 (2019), https://ngwa.onlinelibrar
y.wiley.com/doi/abs/10. 111 1/gwat. 12940 [https://penna.cc/S7QL-9GER].
369 Id.
170 First Nat'l Exch. Bank of Roanoke v. Roanoke Oil Co., 192 S.E. 764, 770 (Va. 1937); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 81 (1981).
371 KAN. DEP'T OF AGRIC., Water Conservation Areas (WCAs), supra note 363.
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acres have been approved under the WCA program, with water savings of
approximately 12,000 acre-feet per year.3 72 The WCA option seems to be more
appealing to water users in that the agreement is totally voluntary. At least it
avoids the imposition of restrictions deemed necessary by some governmental
entity, whether a GMD or DWR. Granted, WCAs may not be voluntary in the
purest sense, in that water users may not seek to restrict their own use absent
the threat of governmental restrictions, but WCAs offer the most control over
one's own destiny.
E. Kansas Summary
The two new Kansas strategies for extending the life of the Ogallala-High
Plains aquifer represent innovative, collaborative, and apparently successful
efforts in water management. The level of cooperation and leadership
demonstrated in the creation of the Sheridan 6 LEMA set a precedent for what
can be achieved when those in power and those affected by that power work
together to solve a shared problem. The several WCAs that have been created
show a desire of some groundwater users to band together for the common
goal of reduced pumping. Still to be decided by an appellate court in Kansas,
however, is the critical question of whether water users who wish not to
participate can be forced to do so by the Chief Engineer in an IGUCA or by a
GMD in a LEMA.
V. SUMMARY
This article began with a description of a spectrum of ways states have
addressed the problem of groundwater depletion-from forced reductions
without compensation, to financially-based incentive programs in which an
entity pays groundwater users to give up their rights either temporarily or
permanently, to the rare, totally voluntary reductions based purely on altruism.
We have attempted to illustrate some novel attempts at solving the
groundwater depletion problem with the employment of pump restrictions
established with bottoms-up, community-based, voluntary programs instead of
top-down, state regulatory, forced pump restrictions commonly used to date.
These attempts at voluntarism could represent a trend. If so, other trends in
water policy and law support these approaches: establishing water banks,
3 '7
permitting more flexibility in seasonal and annual pumping, and encouraging
water marketing programs, each of which add flexibility in the water right
permitting systems. Programs based on financial incentives, like those of the
federal government and the Texas VISPO program, will hopefully continue
alongside these new community-based programs.
172 Id.; GROUNDWATER MGMT. DIST. 1, supra note 339.
171 See, e.g., The Kansas Water Banking Act, KAN. STAT. ANN § 82a-761 to -771 (West 2019).
